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Abstract

In the most recent years, the Command, Control and Communications, Counter
Measures, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C3CMISR) aircrafts are used
commonly in many NATO and UN Operations around the world. These aircrafts are
AWACS, JSTARS, Rivet Joint, Compass Call and ABCCC. They provide close air
support in the name of airborne surveillance, ground moving target surveillance, target
reconnaissance, jamming, and command, control and communications issues in
operational environments.
Those aircrafts are tasked with a wide variety of missions than ever before in
operational theaters and each one of them comprises a specific amount of cost and risk
factors. As a new vision, while replacing the existing legacy systems, multi-mission
architectures are taken into consideration for the C3CMISR missions. The stated
objective is designing a one tail number Multi-Mission Aircraft (MMA) that includes all
the C3CMISR tasks on one airframe.
This study seeks some comments and advises about the MMA design technical
feasibility. In order to search for these comments, four notional operational scenarios are
created. First of all existing C3CMISR aircrafts are considered and evaluated in these
operational scenarios and then different MMA architectures are defined and compared
with the legacy systems in the name of adequacy.

xviii

MULTIMISSION AIRCRAFT DESIGN STUDY - OPERATIONAL
SCENARIOS

Chapter 1 - Introduction
1.1 Chapter Overview
This thesis provides operational feasibility data for a Multi-Mission Aircraft
(MMA) design by creating four notional operational scenarios which combine some of all
the functions of the existing AWACS, JSTARS, RIVET JOINT, COMPASS CALL, and
ABCCC aircrafts which are C-135 and C-130 theater-based command and control (C2)
and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. It also provides some
technical information about the use of UAVs in operational environments. This chapter
includes background, scope, problem statement, objectives, methodology, and
assumptions and limitations of the study.
1.2 Background
In the last twenty years, the technology for battlefield Command, Control,
Communications, and Counter Measures, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
(C3CMISR) has greatly improved and has become a central element in battlefield
operations. The ISR platforms are now “must-have” assets for any modern military force.
The current operational ISR platforms for the USA and its allies are AWACS, JSTARS,
RIVET JOINT, COMPASS CALL, ABCCC, and KC-135 Tanker Aircraft. Each system
has its own capabilities and operational flexibilities. A MMA technical feasibility study
has been requested to take the place of the aging fleet of C-130 and C-135 based theater
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C2 and ISR Aircraft by the Director of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance,
DCS, Air and Space Operations. This official thesis topic proposal is presented in
Appendix A. A new, modern wide-body commercial/noncommercial aircraft would be
chosen by the US Air Force to replace these existing fleets. It is proposed that the MMA
be out-fitted to combine some or all the functions of existing AWACS, JSTARS, RIVET
JOINT, COMPASS CALL, and ABCCC platforms. The MMA would also have links to
other manned or unmanned ISR aircraft and satellites. These five aircrafts are used
individually as C3CMISR platforms in recent operational theaters by US or its allies.
These missions include, battlefield surveillance, airborne early warning (AEW),
jamming, and signals intelligence (SIGINT) missions.
The US is looking for a Multi-Mission Aircraft (MMA) which would have a
larger body than the existing aircraft platforms in order to develop warfare issues and win
the combats with less effort and cost with the highest benefit. This MMA platform will
indicate current platforms and combine some or all of the functions.
An option for a cheap and easy solution for that problem would be Unmanned Air
Vehicles (UAVs), but this is the most limited option. These aircrafts are too small to be
able to carry the large payloads, such as Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and other EW
systems that are on existing platforms. Since there would be no C3CMISR operators
onboard, the data acquired by a UAV would have to be shuttled over high-speed
datalinks to a ground, air, or sea-based command centers. Because of this reason, the
manned C3CMISR MMA architectures are considered in this study.
As a second thought, USAF has proposed to replace their existing tanker aircrafts
which are Boeing KC-135 aerial tanker fleet, with Boeing 767 jetliners. The tankers are
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generally tasked to remain outside the Area of Operations (AO) and just outside battle
areas in order to refuel aircrafts participating in the combat. It seems like a logical step to
make the tanker aircrafts able to carry the required payloads and useful electronic warfare
equipments as sensors as well. The first idea has been modulated for fitting the machines
with a removable pallet of communications electronics to allow strike elements from
different services and different nations to relay communications electronics to allow
strike elements from different services and different nations to relay communications
between each other. If this can be done, the idea of other payloads, such as SIGINT or
surveillance equipment also could be carried as well. This idea is in consideration, but
because of the possibility of rapid change in operational task needs, it might seem like
tough to achieve.
As the most accepted option, a wide body commercial aircraft like the Boeing 767
would be modified for military needs. Such a Multi-Sensor Command & Control Aircraft
(MC2A) could be modified and configured to perform airborne warning, ground
surveillance, SIGINT, or countermeasures tasks. With an Active Electronically Scanned
Array system, it might be possible to perform many of these functions using the same
equipment. A fleet of MC2A Boeing 767 capable of different C3CMISR roles and with
interchangeable payloads could be deployed to meet a wide range of missions and tasks.
Based on this idea, US has been begun some projects to make the MC2A a reality. (1)
1.3 Scope of the Study
The primary aim of this study is to consider the Multi-Mission Aircraft design
possibility to achieve success in operational environments and theaters. The study
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explores information on the feasibility of the five alternative MMA architectures based
on four notional operational scenarios.
The study of MMA has been preceded by accepting the fact that the whole subject
is a very complicated issue. It should be formed by numerous engineering fields and
required a lot of scientific research. This MMA feasibility study in operational
environments has been preceded by getting feedback from electromagnetic spectrum and
payload integration of the aircraft. As we are looking for feasibility of a MMA design and
its compatibility for all required tasks in notional operational scenarios, all the sensors for
the joint missions and their compatibility, crew and all of the hardware and software to be
placed into the fuselage of the selected aircraft are being considered. All of these factors
affect the overall limits of the aircraft like weight, lift and range. Besides these limitations
the electromagnetic compatibility and electromagnetic interference of the sensors and
antennas are important issues which must be defined clearly in order to achieve the
required tasks and missions.
The feasibility of alternative MMA architectures is evaluated in four notional
operational scenarios. In these notional operational scenarios five alternative MMA
architectures are defined in order to evaluate the feasibility of these architectures in a
wide range of tasks and missions due to mission achievement of C3CMISR capabilities.
At the conclusions part, UAVs are also taken into consideration as additional
elements that can accomplish missions in battle theaters that are not feasible to alternative
MMA architectures.
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1.4 Problem Statement
The problem statement can be defined basically as technical feasibility
requirements of a designed multi-mission aircraft which contains all the existing
C3CMISR sensors, antennas, crew, hardware and software. While designing an aircraft
or modifying an existing fuselage for all of the required C3CMISR capabilities, various
technical problems may occur. The aim of this study is to anticipate these possible
technical problems and to consider feasible MMA designs.
1.5 Objectives of the Study
Considering a multi-mission aircraft design, the various technical risks involved
in combining onto one aircraft fuselage with multiple functions has been faced. These
risks, which have been mentioned before, are payload integration, electromagnetic
interference and compatibility. The main goal of the MMA design feasibility study is to
maintain current power requirements of the aircraft while achieving the required tasks in
operational scenarios by the design parameters of a multi-functional aircraft. By studying
all of the risk factors, general recommendations have been defined in order to combine all
the C3CMISR functions into one aircraft with no or minimal technical risk. The study
includes MMA design technical feasibility risks with just one aircraft as well as with
different tail numbers in order to evaluate the achievement of the required operational
tasks.
1.6 Methodology
This study uses a Systems Engineering approach. Systems Engineering
Methodology is used for defining the problem and Hatley/Hruschka/Pirbhai (HHP)
Methodology is used for creating the system model. Basically the Systems Engineering
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Methodology includes problem definition, value system design, systems synthesis, and
systems analysis, optimization of alternatives, decision making and planning for action.
After defining the problem and goal of the study, an operational architecture is created
and the entire mission tasks and system requirements are defined based on this
architecture. Finally, systems requirements are determined and the whole system is
modeled in order to provide some recommendations and create an idea of the possible
risks and negative aspects of the MMA design in notional operational scenarios.
1.7 Assumptions and Limitations of the Study
By creating different notional scenarios of operational theaters, various situations
and tasks have been checked and an idea of the feasibility of MMA has been formed. In
order to form these feasibility approaches, some assumptions have been made in
developing the scenarios because of the lack of specific data in aircraft design, besides
the handicap of not being able to obtain classified or limited distribution information. The
assumptions that are made in order to cerate the notional operational scenarios are shown
as a table in Appendix B. Some of the past experiences, like early operations by NATO
and UN Forces, have been also used in order to clarify and shed light on some aspects of
the tasks and issues.
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review
2.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter first describes the past and present usage and some technical
operational data AWACS, JSTARS, RIVET JOINT, COMPASS CALL, and ABCCC
ISR Aircrafts. Then definition of C3CMISR in operational theater, basic information
about intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), intelligence programs and systems,
the information collection resources and the elements of intelligence support follow.
2.2 Current and Historical Operational Data of C3CMISR Aircrafts
In the past operations of USA and its allies, the above C3CMISR aircrafts have
been used individually according to the needs of the Operation Theater, missions and
tasks. Now these aircrafts’ individual missions and capabilities are planned to be
combined in one architecture or in different tail numbers if it appears that all of the ISR
equipments, sensors, antennas and crew are not going to fit into one architecture.
2.2.1 AWACS Technical Data and Operational Use
AWACS E-3 Sentry is an airborne warning and control system aircraft
that provides all-weather surveillance, command, control and communications in
operation theaters. The data provided by these aircrafts is an essential operational element
for commanders of NATO, USA and other allied air defense forces. AWACS is accepted
as the premier air battle command and control aircraft in the world today.
The airframe of the E-3 Sentry, is a modified Boeing 707/320 commercial
airframe with a rotating radar dome which is shown in Figure 2-1. It contains a radar
subsystem that permits surveillance from the earth’s surface up into the stratosphere, over
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land or water. The radar has a range of a more than 250 miles (375.5 kilometers) for lowflying targets and farther for aerospace vehicles flying at medium to high altitudes. The
radar is combined with an identification friend or foe (IFF) subsystem that can look down
to detect, identify and track enemy and friendly low-flying aircraft by eliminating ground
space returns that confuse other radar systems.
The AWACS E-3 fleet went through an upgrade in 2001. This Block 30/35
Modification Program included major enchantments, including an Electronic Support
Measure for passive detection, an electronic surveillance capability to detect and identify
air and surface; a Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) to provide
secure, anti-jam communication for information distribution, position location and
identification capabilities; an increase in the memory capability in the computer to
contain JTIDS, EMS and future enhancements and Global Positioning System (GPS), a
satellite-based positioning capability to provide precise global navigation.(2)
Other major E-3 Sentry subsystems are navigation, communications and
computers which process data. AWACS crew consists of 13 to 19 specialists which are
console operators that perform surveillance, identification, weapons control, and battle
management and communications functions. The radar and computer subsystems on the
AWACS can gather and present wide and comprehensive battle field information. Data is
collected in real-time in the operational theater. Operational data, including position and
tracking information on enemy aircraft and ships, and location and status of friendly
aircraft and naval vessels, is collected real. The information can be sent to major
command and control centers in rear areas or aboard ships.
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In support of air-to-ground operations, the AWACS can provide direct
information needed for interdiction reconnaissance, airlift and close-air support for
friendly ground forces. It can also provide information for air operation commanders to
gain and maintain control of the air battle. As an air defense system, E-3 Sentry can
detect, identify and track airborne enemy forces far from the boundaries of the countries.
It can direct fighter-interceptor aircraft to these enemy targets. Operational experience
has proved that the E-3 Sentry can respond quickly and effectively to a crisis and support
worldwide military deployments. It is a jam-resistant system that has performed missions
while experiencing heavy electronic countermeasures.
AWACS has a lot of superiority compared to ground–based radars. It has mobility
which provides it a greater chance of surviving in warfare than fixed radar. It can quickly
change its flight path according to mission and survival needs. It’s 8 hour mission profile
and range can be increased through in-flight refueling and on-board crew rest support. (3)

Figure 2-1 E-3 Sentry AWACS
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2.2.2 RIVET JOINT Technical Data and Operational Use
The RC-135V/W Rivet Joint is a reconnaissance aircraft that supports theater
operations with near real-time on-scene intelligence collection, analysis and
dissemination capabilities.
The RC-135 V/W Rivet Joint is a highly modified C-135 aircraft which is shown
in Figure 2-2. These modifications are primarily related to its on-board sensor suite,
which allows the mission crew to detect, identify and geolocate signals throughout the
electromagnetic spectrum. So we can define the aircraft as a long-range, high-altitude
version of the C-135, which is a military version of the Boeing 707. The mission crew,
which are 21-27 depending on mission requirements, can provide forward information in
a variety of formats to a wide range of consumers via Rivet Joint’s extensive
communications suite. Minimum mission flight crew consists of 3 electronic warfare
officers, 14 intelligence operators and 4 in-flight/airborne maintenance technicians. (4)
This aircraft has an extensive antenna array and can provide direct, near real-time
reconnaissance information and electronic warfare support to theater commanders and
combat forces on operational theaters (5). The data collected by Rivet Joint is essential
for effective combat operations. Although the flight crew stations are similar, the avionics
of Rivet Joint varies in specialized electronics ( for pick up of single point, short duration
signals) as the type of sensors, receiver systems, probe, blade, wire and dielectric panel
antenna, camera windows and fairings installed from the conventional international
reconnaissance equipment. All RC-135s are equipped with an air refueling system and
carry high, very high, and ultra high frequency radios, radar, and doppler/GPS/stellar/INS
(Internal Navigation System) navigation system. It collects, analyzes, reports, and
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exploits enemy BM (Battle Management)/C4I (Command, Control, Communications,
Computers and Intelligence). During most contingencies, it deploys to the theater
operations with the airborne elements of TACS (AWACS, ABCCC, Joint STARS, etc.)
and is connected to the aircraft via datalinks and voice as required. Refined data can be
transferred from the Rivet Joint to AWACS through the Tactical Digital Link TADIL/A
or into intelligence channels via satellite and the Tactical Information Broadcast Service
(TIBS), which is nearly real-time theater information broadcast. (6)
Basic roles of RC-135 V/W Rivet Joint in an operational environment include
providing indications about the location and intentions of enemy forces and warnings of
threatening activity; broadcasting a variety of direct voice communications of highest
priority which are combat advisory broadcasts and forthcoming threat warnings that can
be sent direct to aircraft in danger; operating both data and voice links to provide target
info to US ground based air defenses. The Rivet Joint aircraft is capable of conducting
ELINT (Electronics Intelligence) and COMINT (Communications Intelligence) intercept
operations against targets at ranges up to 240 kilometers.(7)
Some of the operations supported by Rivet Joint over the past decade includes
Urgent Fury, Eldorado Canyon, Just Cause, Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Proven Force,
Provide Comfort, Southern Watch, Vigilant Warrior, Deny Flight, Provide Promise, and
Uphold Democracy. Most recently, it used over Bosnia. (8)
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Figure 2-2 RC-135V/W Rivet Joint
2.2.3 JSTARS Technical Data and Operational Use
The E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) is an
airborne battle management and command (C2) platform. It conducts ground surveillance
to develop an understanding of the enemy situation and to support attack operations and
targeting that contributes to the delay, disturbance and destruction of enemy forces. These
functions support the primary mission of Joint STARS which is to provide dedicated
support of ground and air theater commanders.
The E-8C shown in Figure 2-3 is a modified Boeing 707-300 series commercial
airframe widely remanufactured and modified with the radar, communications,
operations and control subsystems required to perform its operational mission. It has a
canoe-shaped radome under the forward fuselage which contains the side-looking
phased-array antenna. The Joint STARS can respond quickly and effectively to support
worldwide military contingency operations. It is a jam-resistant system capable of
operating while experiencing heavy electronic countermeasures. It has an increased range
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and on-station time through in-flight refueling. (9) Joint STARS operates in virtually any
weather, on-line, in-real-time, around the clock. The augmented Army-Air Force mission
crew can be deployed to a potential trouble spot within hours and provide valuable data
on ground force movements. (10)
The radar and computer subsystems on the E-8C can gather and display broad and
detailed battlefield information. Data is collected as events occur. This includes position
and tracking information on enemy and friendly ground forces. The information is
relayed in near-real time to the Army’s common ground stations via the secure jamresistant surveillance and control data link and to other ground command, control,
communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) nodes beyond line-of-sight via ultra
high frequency satellite communications.
The radar operating modes of E-3C include wide area surveillance (WAS),
moving target indicator (MTI), fixed target indicator (FTI), target classification and
synthetic aperture radar (SAR). The antenna can be tilted to either side of the aircraft
where it can develop a 120-degree field of view covering nearly 19,305 square miles
(50,000 square kilometers) and is capable of detecting targets at more than 250
kilometers (more than 820,000 feet). In addition to being able to detect, locate and track
large numbers of ground vehicles the radar has some limited capability to detect
helicopters, rotating antennas and low, slow-moving fixed wing aircraft. (9) WAS/MTI is
designed to detect, locate and identify slow-moving targets. Through advanced signal
processing, Joint STARS can differentiate between wheeled and tracked vehicles. By
focusing on smaller terrain areas, the radar image can be enhanced for increased
resolution display. This high resolution is used to define moving targets and provide
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combat units with accurate information for attack planning. SAR/FTI produces a
photographic-like image or map of selected geographic regions. SAR data maps contain
precise locations of critical non-moving targets such as bridges, harbors, airports,
buildings, or stopped vehicles. The FTI display is available while operating in the SAR
mode to identify and locate fixed targets within the SAR area. The SAR and FTI
capability used in conjunction with MTI and MTI history display allows post-attack
assessments to be made by onboard or ground operators following a weapon attack on
hostile targets. (10)
Other major E-8C prime mission equipments are communications and operations
and control subsystems. 18 operator workstations display computer-processed data in
graphic and tabular format on video screens. On a long endurance mission the aircraft has
a crew of 34, with 6 flight crew and 28 system operators. Operators and technicians
perform battle management, surveillance, weapons, intelligence, communications and
maintenance functions. (9)
The digital datalinks include a satellite communications link (SATCOM),
surveillance and control datalink (SCDL) for transmission to mobile ground stations, and
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS). The JTIDS provides tactical air
navigation (TACAN) operation and Tactical Data Information Link-J (TADIL-J)
generation and processing. The Cubic Defense Systems SCDL is a time division multiple
access datalink incorporating flexible frequency management. The system employs
wideband frequency hopping, coding and data diversity to achieve robustness against
hostile jamming. Uplink transmissions use a modulation technique to determine the path
delay between the ground system module and the E-8 aircraft.
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In support of air-to-ground operations, the E-8C can provide real time information
needed to increase ground situation awareness with intelligence support, attack support
and targeting operations including attack aviation, naval surface fire, field artillery and
friendly maneuver forces. It also provides information for air and land commanders to
gain and maintain control of the battle-space and execute against enemy forces. As a
battle management and command and control asset, the E-8C can support the full
spectrum of roles and missions from peacekeeping operations to major theater war. (11)
JSTARS was first deployed in Operation Desert Storm in 1991 when still in
development. Joint STARS developmental aircraft were also called to support the NATO
peacekeeping mission, Operation Joint Endeavor, in December 1995. It monitored treaty
compliance while NATO rotated troops through Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is deployed in
support of Operation Enduring Freedom from November 2001 to April 2002 with a
98.4% mission effectiveness rate, supporting the war on terrorism. The E-3C Joint
STARS routinely supports various taskings of the Combined Force Command Korea
during the North Korean winter exercise cycle and for the United Nations enforcing
resolutions on Iraq. (11) (9)
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Figure 2-3 E-8C Joint STARS
2.2.4 COMPASS CALL Technical Data and Operational Use
Compass Call is a code name for an Electronic Countermeasure (ECM) system
installed aboard the US EC-130H aircraft. The EC-130H Rivet Fire/Compass Call is the
designation for a modified version of Lockheed corporation’s C-130 Hercules aircraft
configured to perform tactical command, control and communications countermeasures
(C3CM) and it’s shown in Figure 2-4. Targeting command and control provides
commanders with an immense advantage before and during the air campaign. Compass
Call provides a non-lethal means of denying and disrupting enemy command and control,
degrading his combat capability and reducing losses to friendly forces.
The EC-130H Compass Call is the only US wide-area offensive information
warfare platform and provides disruptive communications jamming and other unique
capabilities to support the Joint Force Commander across the spectrum of conflict.
Specifically, the modified aircraft uses noise jamming to prevent communication or
degrade the transfer of information essential to command and control of weapon systems
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and other resources. It primarily supports tactical air operations but also can provide
jamming support to ground force operations.
Modifications to the aircraft include an electronic countermeasures system (Rivet
Fire) and air refueling capability and associated navigation and communication systems.
Additional blade-shaped antennas were added to the basic C-130 Hercules along with
trailing wire antennas deployed from pods on the tail and under the wings.
During Operation Desert Storm EC-130H Compass Call electronic warfare
aircraft, operating outside Iraqi airspace, safe from Iraqi defenses, jammed
communications, hindering the effectiveness of Iraq’s integrated air defense network.
Rivet Fire has demonstrated its powerful effect on enemy command and control networks
in Panama and Iraq.
Compass Call integrates into tactical air operation at any level. Although
Compass Call primarily supports interdiction and offensive counter-air campaigns, the
truly versatile and flexible nature of the aircraft and its crew enable the power of EC130H to be brought to bear on virtually any combat situations.
The EC-130H aircraft carries a combat crew of 13 people. Four members are
responsible for aircraft flight and navigation, while nine members operate and maintain
the Rivet Fire equipment. The mission crew consist of an electronic warfare officer, who
is the mission crew commander (MCC), an experienced cryptologic linguist, an
Acquisition Operator, a high Band Operator, four analysis operators, and an airborne
maintenance technician (AMT). Either the Analysis Operator or the High Band Operator
can be promoted to the position of mission crew supervisor (MCS).
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Aided by the automated system, the crew analyzes the signal environment,
designate targets and ensure the system is operating effectively. Targets can be
designated before the mission takes off, acquired in flight or the MCC/MCS can receive
additional tasking at any time from outside agencies (i.e. Airborne Warning and Control
System, RC-135 and Airborne Command and Control System). A radio frequency signal
runs from the beginning of the received path through the system and is analyzed at
different points along the way. In a war situation, a signal may be received and linguists
on board the plane analyze it to determine if it is an enemy signal. If the system decides
there is a threat, communications would be jammed by the officer on board pressing the
red buttons. On the back of the plane is microwave powered equipment which sends out
high energy radio frequency output or interference.
The latest technologies, referred to as Block 30 system, update the fleet and keep
the 41st Electronic Combat Squadron’s Combat Systems Flight busy ironing out the bugs.
The flight’s 25 computer and electronic warfare troops perform organizational level
maintenance on EC-130H weapons systems. Block 30 totally rearranges the equipment
on the EC-130H and incorporates fiber optics. There are more fiber optic terminations on
this plane than any other plane flying, commercial; or military today. Block 30
improvements include faster and more powerful computers and integrated work stations
which enable the fleet to accomplish its primary mission of denying enemy commanders
the ability to command their troops in the battlefield. Unlike Block 20, which operates
through a mainframe, Block 30 is broken down into different components which
communicate with each other. (12)
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Figure 2-4 EC-130H RIVET FIRE/COMPASS CALL
2.2.5 ABCCC Technical Data and Operational Use
The EC-130E ABCCC consists of seven aircrafts that are used as an Airborne
Battlefield Command and Control Center. It is a modified C-130 Hercules aircraft
designed to carry the USC-48 Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center
Capsules (ABCCC III). These one-of-a kind aircraft include the addition of external
antennae to accommodate the vast number radios in the capsule, heat exchanger pods for
additional air conditioning, an aerial refueling system and special mounted rails for
uploading and downloading the USC-48 capsule. The ABCCC has distinctive air
conditioner intakes fore of the engines (“Mickey Mouse ears”), two HF radio probestowards the tips of both wings, and three mushroom-shaped antennas on the top of the
aircraft-and, of course, numerous antennas on the belly.
As an Air Combat Command asset, ABCCC is an integral part of the Tactical Air
Control System. While functioning as a direct extension of ground-based command and
control authorities, the primary mission is providing flexibility in the overall control of
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tactical air resources. In addition, to maintain positive control of air operations, ABCCC
can provide communications to higher headquarters, including national command
authorities, in both peace and wartime environments.
The USC-48 ABCCC III capsule, which fits into the aircraft cargo compartment,
measures 40 feet long, weighs approximately 20,000 pounds and costs $9 million each.
The ABCCC provides unified and theater commanders an Airborne Battlefield Command
and Control Center (ABCCC), with the capacity for combat operations during war,
contingencies, exercises, and special classified missions. Mission roles include airborne
extensions of the Air Operations Center (AOC) and Airborne Air Support Operations
Center (ASOC) for command and control of Offensive Air Support (OAS) operations;
and airborne on-scene command for special operations such as airdrops or evacuations.
The ABCCC system is a high-tech automated airborne command and control
facility featuring computer generated color displays, digitally controlled communications,
and rapid data retrieval. The platform’s 23 fully securable radios, secure teletype, and 15
automatic fully computerized consoles, allow the battle staff to quick analyze current
combat situations and direct offensive air support towards fast-developing targets.
ABCCC, is equipped with its most recent upgrade the Joint Tactical Information
Distribution System, allows real-time accountability of airborne tracks to capsule
displays through data links with AWACS E-3 “Sentry” aircraft.
The flight deck crew is standard C-130 crew and the airborne battle staff can be
tailored to fit any mission based on operational needs. The battle staff is comprised of
four functional areas: command, operations, intelligence, and communications. Normally,
it includes 12 members working in nine different specialties.
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The Director of the Airborne Battle Staff (DABS)/Command Section is
responsible for the overall battle staff operations for monitoring the current air situation
and emphasizing integration of offensive and support operations. When an Airborne
Command Element (ACE) is onboard the ABCCC, the ACE will provide
theater/component commander representation increasing mission effectiveness by
providing theater unique expertise (C2, logistics, communications, reconstitution, the air
tasking order, and battle plans).
A Battle Staff Operations Officer (BSOO) runs the Operations Section which
consists of Airborne Strike Controllers (ASC) and Airborne Close Air Support
Coordinators (ACASCO). The operations section is responsible for monitoring and, if
delegated the authority, directing changes in the employment of air resources within the
AOR assigned.
The Intelligence Section: an Airborne Intelligence Officer (AIO) and Technician
(AIT) continually correlates, analyzes, fuses, and disseminates intelligence and
operational data to the battle staff and other agencies. This section updates battlefield
intelligence, maintains friendly and enemy order of battle and fire support measures, and
validates targets so tactical aircraft have the latest threat warning information. The AIO is
also the focal point for coordination of electronic combat.
The Communications Section provides communication support for the battle staff.
The

Airborne

Communications

System

Operators

(ASCO)

maintain

voice

communications (capsule radio and interphone systems), data link, and teletype
equipment. While Airborne Maintenance Technician (AMT) performs necessary in-flight
maintenance of the different systems in the ABCCC capsule to include booting,
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initialization, and loading of the tactical database taken from the ground-based mission
planning system (MPS) into the capsule’s onboard integrated computer processors.
In addition to these four basic sections, a Ground Liaison Section may be added
the Liaison Section’s composition and manning reflect the type of support required in
relation to the ABCCC NATO mission tasking. Joint and combined operations dictate
operational Liaison Officer (LNO) interface within the ABCCC battle staff. LNOs
provide information regarding tasking which the ABCCC battle staff supports, current
situation and planned operations, fire support measures, selected airspace deconfliction,
and communications and intelligence information relay. The LNOs are members of the
Ground Component effort, and overall ground scheme of maneuver to make decision
recommendations to the DABS. LNOs serve as the focal point for the battle staff’s
ground force information requirements and have communications links to acquire
additional information. The Army LNO(s) serve as a limited Battlefield Coordination
Element (BCE) Operations and Fusion Section representative. (13)

Figure 2-5 EC-130E ABCCC
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2.3 Definition of C3CMISR Capabilities in Operational Theaters
We can define the C3CMISR as a feature responsible for providing capabilities
that enable the military forces of the US and its allies to generate, use, and share the
information necessary to survive and succeed on every mission. This can be done if the
information superiority is taken in battlefield. Information superiority is the capability to
collect, process, and disseminate and interrupted flow of information while exploiting or
denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. To achieve this capability, the forces in the
battlefield must have a comprehensive knowledge of the battlefield, including the status
and intensions of both adversary and friendly forces. Information superiority is the
backbone of military innovation. To significantly enhance joint operations on a
battlefield, information and command and control are needed to be improved and
comprehensively provided.
There are some global terms that have been used in the name of Global operations
like The Global Command and Control System (GCCS) which has replaced the World
Wide Military Command and Control System and provides friendly forces with an
enhanced common operational picture, force status, intelligence support, enemy order of
battle, related facility information, and air tasking orders. Also Global Combat Support
System (GCSS) complements GCCS by providing warfighters with the ability to track
the status and location of critical logistics, procurement, engineering, finance, personnel,
and medical resources. All of these efforts are taken in order to promote information
availability and interoperability between Services and multinational partners.
In this century’s increased warfare demands for information have revealed the
need for enhanced and comprehensive airborne reconnaissance coverage and increased
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reconnaissance operating pace. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are been used in ISR
activities to complement current manned systems with significant savings, but manned
airborne surveillance and reconnaissance properties are developing better situational
awareness by using enhanced and modernized capabilities, such as Moving Target
Indicator.
There are some defense security programs which prevent or deter espionage,
sabotage, subversion, theft, or the unauthorized use of classified or controlled
information, systems, or war material. The Information Operations (IO) are actions taken
across the entire conflict to achieve specific objectives over an adversary. Information
assurance protects and defends information systems by ensuring their availability,
integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality. Information Assurance (IA) is the component
of Information Operations that assures operational readiness by providing for the
continuous availability and reliability of information systems and networks.
On an overall C3CMISR architecture, to ensure consistent implementation and
effective employment in all operations are critical. The joint tactical architecture, which
facilitates use and exchange of information for operational planning and combat decision
making, is most important C3CMISR architecture initiative. (14)
2.4 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)
IPB is the best process for understanding the operation theater and the options it
presents to friendly and threat forces. IPB is a systematic, continuous process of
analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. It is designed to
support staff estimates and military decision making. Applying the IPB process helps the
commander selectively apply and maximize his combat power at critical points in time

24

and space on the battlefield by; determining the threat’s likely Courses of Action (COA),
and describing the environment your unit is operating within and effects of the
environment on your unit.
IPB is a continuous process which consists of four steps which you perform each
time you conduct IPB. These steps are; define the battlefield environment, describe the
battlefield’s effects, evaluate the threat and determine threat COAs. The IPB process is
continuous. You conduct IPB prior to and during the commandant’s initial planning for
an operation, but you also continue to perform IPB during the conduct of the operation.
Each function in the process is performed continuously to ensure that; the products of
IPB remain complete and valid and you provide support to the commander and direction
to the intelligence system throughout the current mission and into preparation for the
next. (15)
2.5 Intelligence Programs and Systems
As we would like to define the intelligence programs and systems in to basic
steps, these categories are going to be core, tasking, collection, processing, dissemination,
security and other systems.
Core systems include system architectures for intelligence systems and
applications interoperability, as well as those technical standards and common
infrastructure elements, such as operating systems, that support such interoperability.
Tasking systems are used to direct and prioritize collection requirements, and
form the interface between consumers and producers of intelligence products.
Collection systems come from a variety of organizations, echelons, services, and
intelligence disciplines. These include but are not limited to tactical ground-based
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Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),
and space systems.
Processing systems receive, convert and correlate information into a form usable
as combat information or intelligence. These processors are found at all echelons of the
intelligence architecture, and include both primary processing and secondary exploitation
systems.
Dissemination systems provide the communications links between collection
systems, processors, and users. These include both the physical communications
channels, as well as networks, protocols and software, and databases and servers for the
staging of products for dissemination.
Security systems provide information security protection to communication links,
processors, and users.
Other programs are a catch-all residual category, which includes a variety of
programs that appear to be intelligence-related but whose exact purpose and nature
remains unintelligible. (16)
2.6 Information Collection Resources
Intelligence is the operational theater commanders’ decision-making tool. To
provide continuous intelligence and information for the battlefield procures successful
operations and minimizes risks. (17)
Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) is considered the next
frontier in establishing information superiority for several difficult tactical and
intelligence problems, such as weapons of mass destruction, countermeasures, threat
definition, and indications of warning on an operational theater. Many of the traditional
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Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) systems provide part of
the picture, but a more complete assessment is needed, particularly for quick reaction, in
indefinite situations, or in the presence of camouflage, suppression, and deception. (18)
MASINT is a scientific and technical intelligence information obtained by
quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time
dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic derived from specific technical
sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the source,
emitter, or sender and to facilitate subsequent identification and/or measurement of the
same. MASINT includes; Radar Intelligence (RADINT), Acoustic Intelligence
(ACOUSTINT), Nuclear Intelligence (NUCINT), Radio Frequency/Electromagnetic
Pulse Intelligence (RF/EMPINT), Electro-optical Intelligence (ELECTRO-OPTINT),
Laser

Intelligence

(LASINT),

Materials

Intelligence,

Unintentional

Radiation

Intelligence (RINT), Chemical and Biological Intelligence (CBINT), Directed Energy
Weapons

Intelligence

(DEWINT),

Effluent/Debris

Collection,

Spectroscopic

Intelligence, and Infrared Intelligence (IRINT). (19)
2.7 Elements of Intelligence Support
The main goal for the C3CMISR aircrafts is to provide real-time on-scene data for
the friendly operational units over the battlefield. If this data flow can be provided
without any interference or interception over the battlefield, a continuous C3CMISR
issues are provided among operational units. The proper and on-time battlefield
intelligence provides the information superiority which allows increased choices for
commanders and increased information at all levels. This also leads the commanders to
enlist new tools and procedures. Information is the key capability for a force and it
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presents importance across the full range of operations. The factors of information
superiority goes through full spectrum dominance, which can be achieved by carrying out
some effective ways as being credible in peace, decisive in war and finest in any form of
conflict. This concept is shown in Figure 2-6.

Figure 2 – 6 Information Superiority Concept (20)
In order to reach information superiority in an operational theater, Intelligence
and Electronic Warfare (IEW), Electronic Warfare (EW) and Counter Intelligence (CI)
issues provide intelligence at all echelons to support accomplishment of the mission.
These IEW support elements are used by C3CMISR aircrafts in different theatres for
different operational needs.
2.7.1 Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
SIGINT is analyzed information resulting from monitoring and locating
enemy communications and noncommunications system such as enemy radars. The two
types of SIGINT are; intelligence derived from monitoring enemy communications is
called communications intelligence (COMINT), and intelligence resulting from
monitoring noncommunications emitters is called electronic intelligence (ELINT).
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2.7.2 Electronic Warfare (EW)
EW is one of the combat multipliers. It can interrupt enemy command and
control and fire support communications when used during a critical phase of the battle.
Some aspects of it will protect friendly communications. The three elements of EW are:
Electronic Warfare Support Measures (ESM) that gives us immediate risk recognition,
combat information, and target acquisition as well as the specific frequencies and radio
nets we want to jam; Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) consists of jamming enemy
communications and electronic deception; Electronic Counter-Countermeasures (ECCM)
are the responsibility of friend signal officer and consists of measures to protect friendly
command, control and communications (C3).
2.7.3 Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
2.7.3.1 Counterintelligence (CI)
CI protects the force through evaluation of the enemy’s
multidiscipline intelligence gathering capabilities. It detects, evaluates, counteracts, and
prevents hostile intelligence collection, subversion, and sabotage. CI also provides
important support to the commander’s Operations Security (OPSEC) and deception
programs.
2.7.3.2 Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)
IMINT is used to acquire and exploit visual representations on the
battlefield that contribute to situation development, targeting, and Bomb Damage
Assessment (BDA). IMINT sensors include electro-optical, infrared, Forward Looking
Infrared (FLIR), and RADAR imaging systems. An IR image that has been taken from an
aerial vehicle is shown in Figure 2-7;
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Figure 2 – 7 Aerial FLIR Image of an Operational Theater Scene
2.7.3.3 Intelligence System of Systems
No single level has sufficient organic intelligence capabilities to
satisfy all our priority intelligence and targeting requirements. Friendly intelligence
officer must know and understand how to obtain support from higher and lower elements
of the intelligence system of requirements. In order to use friendly organic resources
efficiently, the following topics must be understood; command relationship, IEW
standard tactical missions, unit organizational capabilities, limitations, and employment
considerations, detailed collection system capabilities and numbers. (21)
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Chapter 3 – Methodology
3.1 Chapter Overview
In this chapter, the methodology of operations that utilize C3CMISR aircrafts in
warfare theaters is defined. The MMA design is discussed as a Systems Engineering
Process and it is studied by System Engineering methodologies and tools. A systems
architecture approach is applied to the problem. As the main goal for using C3CMISR
aircrafts in operational theaters is getting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
and providing command, control and communication over the whole area, the second
information step is to define the elements of intelligence support. Before creating
notional operational scenarios, some of the targets on the warfare theater are defined and
their importance for destruction is emphasized. Also the basic defense system of the
target country is defined. After these statements, the notional operational theater
scenarios are explained in detail.
3.2 Systems Architecture
All of the Systems Engineering processes, methodologies and tools are the
equipments that model an actual system which defines the requested solution of the
problem. The C3CMISR aircraft design study is analyzed by creating an architecture
model. Before taking the main problem into architecture design process, we should define
what really a systems architecture is. The definition of systems architecture is stated as;
“the fundamental and unifying system structure defined in terms of system
elements, interfaces, processes, constraints, and behaviors” (22)
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by International Council of Systems Engineering (INCOSE) Systems Architecture
Working Group. And it is also defined by the IEEE STD 610.12 as;
“the structure of components, their relationships, and the guidelines governing
their design and evolution over time” (23)
The architecture is used in two different ways. These are descriptive and
implementational architectures. The description of an architecture is the representation of
a notional configuration of assets, regulations, and interactions. After describing the real
problem and designing it, then the implementation takes place.
The architecture has three different perspectives which they are defined as
operational, systems and technical views. Operational architecture view is defined in
C4ISR Architecture Framework as;
“…a description of the tasks and activities, operational elements, and information
flows required to accomplish or support a military operation” (24)
and it provides detail about the information-exchange, interoperability, and performance
parameters required to support a particular mission. Systems architecture view is defined
as;
“…description, including graphics, of systems and interconnections providing
for, or supporting, warfighting functions” (25)
and it defines system attributes, provides the basis for comparing system performance
against operational requirements. Technical architecture view is defined as;
“…the minimal set of rules governing the arrangement, interaction, and
interdependence of system parts or elements, whose purpose is to ensure that a
conformant system satisfies a specified set of requirements” (26)

32

and it defines the specific performance criteria that will result in the fielding of an
interoperable system.
These three architecture views are all expressing different perspectives but
pointing the same architecture design. Instead of taking these different perspectives
individually, it is preferred to take and apply them integrated to each other as multiple
views. That way, the approach to the problem gains a wider angle and this leads to a
more useful and clear process. In order to get the integration between these architecture
views, there must be interrelations between them which are shown in Figure 3-1.

Figure 3 – 1 Interrelations Among the Systems Architecture Views from C4ISR
Architecture Framework Version 2.0 (27)
As we talk about the architecture views, there are also three system aspects to the
problem which are functional, technical and operational. These aspects can be defined as;
what to do, how to do it and who will do it, respectively which are shown in Figure 3–2.
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Figure 3 – 2 Three Aspects of System Engineering Process from Class Notes of
Alexander H. Levis (28)
In MMA design feasibility study, all of these aspects must be applied and
evaluated in order to cover all the system requirements. While creating a notional
operational theater, the units of an operational theater and its elements are defined. These
describe the functions to be performed in the theater. After defining the functions
properly, the way in which these things are going to operate is explained. These are done
by considering different operational scenarios and their applications in this MMA study.
As a final step, who is going to operate the system and take the problem into the solution
process is discussed. In operational scenarios, the users of C3CMISR, the attack and
escort fighter aircrafts are considered as operators of the system. All these three aspects
make us cover the system analysis, system design and system implementation steps in the
whole study.
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3.3 Architecture Development Process and Modeling Approach
The purpose of the architecture is defined in C4ISR Architecture Framework as;

“…to improve capabilities by enabling the quick synthesis of “go-to-war”
requirements with sound investments leading to the rapid employment of improved
operational capabilities, and enabling the efficient engineering of warrior systems” (29)
To carry out the MMA feasibility study in operational environments, the systems
engineering operational concept is followed. The architecture development process starts
with an operational concept. Notional operational theater and scenarios are used to
describe how the missions of current C3CMISR aircrafts are carried out and if a MMA is
put into these scenarios, what the effects would be and what the possible requirements
changes are. The notional operational scenarios are presented as operational concept
maps and the narrative form of each map is also given in order to clarify the existing and
possible required situations. A detailed and suitable operational concept leads to an
executable model for the problem.
The traditional systems engineering architecture modeling approach is structured
analysis. It has four components as; process modeling which describes the process of the
system, data modeling which describes the data structures, rule modeling which is
represented by a set of formal assertions, and dynamics modeling which describes
changes of the system state. All these lead to the executable model of the system. The
modeling components are shown in Figure 3-3.
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MODELING APPROACH

STRUCTURED ANALYSIS
• Process Model
• Data Model
• Rule Model
• Dynamics Model

EXECUTABLE MODEL
Figure 3 -3 Systems Engineering Architecture Modeling Approach
The architecture should provide basic principles as; being built with a purpose in
mind, facilitate communication among humans, and being modular, reusable,
comparable, integratable and decomposable. The MMA aircraft design architecture is
required to cover these principles in order to reach few useful points about feasibility.
(30)
3.4 Data Flow Diagrams for System Design
In this study, an executable model is not searched as a solution to MMA design.
Because of the lack of the data and the assumptions of the classified information, it is not
possible to give specific answers and solutions to this study. The only work has done by
defining the C3CMISR system, its environment, operational requirements and
constraints. The notional scenarios are the objects that point the MMA alternatives
possibilities in operational theaters.
From the Systems Engineering perspective, the data flow diagrams are one of the
processes that are used to develop systems and architectures. Data flow diagrams are
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tools for modeling the system and they show the flow of data within external and internal
sources, transformation and the storing of data. The Context Diagram represents the
highest level of the system design. It precedes with the lower level of data flow diagrams.
Every system component has its subsystems within and the level can go as lower as the
design requirements needed.
The MMA design in operational environments study has three down level
decomposition. Each level defines the data flows and relations between the main function
and its environment. It also points the operational constraints of the system.
The data flow diagrams for the MMA design in operational environments are
shown in Appendix C.
3.5 Battle Planning Process
For an air campaign and a theater level planning, abilities of identify, locate track
and engage fleeting, mobile targets should taken into consideration. The main objective is
to improve joint operations in an operational theater. (31) While planning a battle on a
theater, the main goal which is the national military strategy must be defined. Then the
objectives of the plan must follow the main goal. The close air support in the concept of
operations is one of the most important components of a mission. By planning the right
units for the operation and using them as steps through achievement of the battle, the
direction to executing the mission is taken. This process is shown in Figure 3-4.
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Figure 3 – 4 Battle Planning Process (32)
3.6 Strategic Targets in Theater of Operations
In theater of operations there are numerous targets that need to be destroyed in
order to win the battle. These targets represent the strategic importance in the foe country
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and they are very essential in the war. Basic strategic targets are; command, control and
communication facilities (C3), electrical facilities (ELE), ground order of battle field
(GOB), government centers (GVC), lines of communication (LOC), military industrial
base facilities (MIB), naval facilities (NAV), nuclear, biological, and chemical facilities
(NBC), offensive counter air installations (OCA), oil refining, storage, and distribution
facilities (OIL), surface-to-air missile installations (SAM). To further define these
strategic targets and show a comprehensive level, Table 3-1 is created.

Target Category

Government Control
(GVC) Facility

Electricity (ELE)

Target Type
•

Government Control Centers

•

Government Bodies, General

•

Government Ministries and Administrative
Bodies, Nonmilitary, General

•

Government Detention Facilities, General

•

Unidentified Control Facility

•

Trade, Commerce, and Government, General

•

Civil Defense Facilities (In Military Use)

•

Electric Power Generating, Transmission, and

Facility

Control Facilities
•

Headquarters and Schools

Command, Control and
Communications (C3)
Facility

Offensive Air Command Control

•

Air Defense Headquarters

•

Telecommunications

•

Electronic Warfare

•

Space Systems
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•

Missile Headquarters, Surface-to-Surface

•

National, Combined and Joint Commands

•

Naval Headquarters and Staff Activities

•

Missile Support Facilities, Defensive, General

Surface-To-Air Missiles

•

SAM Missile Sites/Complexes

(SAM) Installation

•

Tactical SAM Sites/Installation

•

SAM Support Facilities

•

Airfields (air bases, reserve fields, helicopter
bases)

•

Noncommunications Electronic Installations
(Radar installations, Radars Collocated with

Offensive Air Counter Air

SAM Sites, ATC/Nav Aids, Meteorological

(OCA) Installation

Radars)
•

Air Logistics, General (Air Depots)

•

Air Ammo Depots (Maintenance and Repair
Bases, Aircraft and Component Production
and Assembly)

•

Atomic Energy Feed and Moderator Materials
Production

Nuclear, Biologiocal, and
Chemical (NBC) Facility

•

Chemical and Biological Production and
Storage

•

Atomic Energy-Associated Facilities
Production and Storage

•

Basic and Applied Nuclear Research and
Development, General

•

Basic Processing and Equipment Production

Military Industrial Base

•

End Products (Chiefly Civilian)

(MIB)

•

Technical Research, Development and
Testing, Nonnuclear
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Naval (NAV)
Facility

•

Covered Storage Facilities, General

•

Material (Chiefly Military)

•

Industrial Production Centers

•

Defense Logistics Agencies

•

Mineable Areas

•

Maritime Port Facilities

•

Cruise Missile Support Facilities, Defensive

•

Shipborne Missile Support Facilities

•

Cruise Surface-to-Surface Missile Launch
Positions

Petroleum, Oil, and

•

Naval Bases, Installations, and Supply Depots

•

POL and Related Products, Pipelines, and

Lubricants (POL) Facility

Storage Facilities

Lines of Communication

•

Highway and Railway Transportation

(LOC) Facility

•

Inland Water Transportation

Ground Order of Battle

•

Military Troop Installations

•

Ground Force Material and Storage Depots

•

Fortifications and Defense Systems

(GOB) Field

Table 3 - 1 (AIF) Target Categories and Target Types (33)
3.7 Notional Operational Theater Scenario
Notional operational theater scenarios are created in order to analyze current
C3CMISR aircrafts in operational theaters. In a notional operational theater, different
scenarios are created and C3CMISR aircrafts are assigned in special varieties. For these
scenarios, some assumptions are made. Those assumptions are shown in Appendix B.
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3.7.1 Basic Map of a Notional Operational Theater
Before creating operational scenarios, the basic map of a notional battle
theater is defined. The map of the basic operational scenario is shown in Figure 3-5. The
basic map shows besides target points and airbases, also the values of length and width of
the whole battle theater. Basically, the battle theater has five different strategic attack
points and two different airbases are set for the friendly aircrafts. The targets and airbases
are named as T1, T2, T3, T4, and T5, and the airbases are named as A1 and A2. The
friendly aircrafts take off from either or both of these airbases and attack to one or more
of the targets through defined missions which are specified as scenarios. A1 and A2 serve
as airbases for the C3CMISR and tanker aircrafts.
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A1
T2

640
miles
1,030
km
T1

T5
440 miles
709 km

T4
T3

A2

TARGET COUNTRY

Figure 3 - 5 Map of Notional Operational Theater Scenario
3.7.2 Notional Target and Airbase Definitions and Coordinates
Table 3–2 shows the definitions and the coordinates of the targets
that have been shown on the notional scenario map. Also the coordinates of airbases are
given at Table 3-3.
TARGET
T1

DEFINITION

COORDINATES

Command, Control & Communication

33○ 19′ 38″ N

(C3) Facility

44○ 22′ 09″ E

T2

Military Industrial Base (MIB)

T3

Offensive Counter Air (OCA)
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36○ 18′ 23″ N
43○ 08′ 38″ E
30○ 32′ 32″ N

T4
T5

Installation

46○ 36′ 07″ E

Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM)

30○ 25′ 18″ N

Installations

47○ 38′ 32″ E

Ground Order of Battle (GOB) Field

33○ 21′ 20″ N
40○ 35′ 48″ E

Table 3 – 2 Target Definitions and Coordinates

AIRBASE
A1
A2

COORDINATES
36○ 59′ 16″ N
35○ 18′ 48″ E
28○ 56′ 05″ N
47○ 47′ 31″ E

Table 3 - 3 Coordinates of Airbases
3.7.3 Distance Calculations between Notional Airbases and Targets
Before the mission is planned, the distances between the airbases and the
targets in the operational theater have to be calculated in order to achieve the given
process. After the exact coordinates are given, by some specific formulas the distances
between points are calculated. The formulas of distance calculation are presented in
Appendix D.
First the distances between points are calculated in normal miles and then
converted into kilometers. The spreadsheet of actual calculations is shown in Appendix
E. By the formula for distance calculation, the distances between airbases and targets on
the notional operational theater are shown at Table 3-5;
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POINT

COORDINATES IN

COORDINATES IN

DEGREES

RADIANS

○

A1
A2

″

36 59 16 N

0.645481 N

35○ 18′ 48″ E

0.616101 E

28○ 56′ 05″ N

0.505006 N

47○ 47′ 31″ E

0.834127 E

33○ 19′ 38″ N

0.583328 N

T1

○

′

″

44 22 09 E

0.774388 E

36○ 18′ 23″ N

0.633666 N

43○ 08′ 38″ E

0.753003 E

30○ 32′ 32″ N

0.533062 N

46○ 36′ 07″ E

0.813357 E

30○ 25′ 18″ N

0.530958 N

47○ 38′ 32″ E

0.831514 E

33○ 21′ 20″ N

0.582164 N

40○ 35′ 48″ E

0.708545 E

T2
T3

′

T4
T5

Table 3 - 4 Conversions from Degrees to Radians

DISTANCES

DISTANCES IN

DISTANCES IN

BETWEEN POINTS

NORMAL MILES

KILOMETERS

A1 - T1

580

950

A1 – T2

440

710

A1 – T3

790

1,280

A1 – T4

840

1,350

A1 – T5

390

630

A2 – T1

370

590

A2 – T2

580

935

A2 – T3

130

210

45

A2 – T4

105

170

A2 – T5

525

845

T1 – T2

212

400

T1 – T3

239

384

T1 – T4

283

455

T1 – T5

218

351

T2 – T3

446

718

T2 – T4

483

778

T2 – T5

251

404

T3 – T4

63

102

T3 – T5

403

649

T4 – T5

461

742

Table 3 – 5 Distances between Airbases and Targets
3.7.4 Defense of Notional Operational Battle Theater
As it can be seen from the map of the notional operational theater in
Figure 3–9, the battle theater has two main airfields that have defensive missile coverage
with different ranges of coverage. Each airfield has three missile types for air defense
named as M1, M2 and M3. These missiles are defined as short-range, mid-range and
long-range missiles respectively. The capabilities of these missiles are shown in Table 36 and the missile radar range coverages are shown in Figure 3-6.
The terms which are expressed in missile capabilities are clarified before proceed into
any further. CEP (Circular Error Probable) is an indicator of the accuracy of a
missile/projectile, used as a factor in determining probable damage to a target as a NATO
and DOD definition. It is the radius of a circle within which half of the
missiles/projectiles are expected to fall. (34) (35)

46

A1

M3

T2

M2
640
miles
1,030
km

M1

600 km
373 miles

750 km
466 miles

T1
Airfield1
T5
440 miles
709 km

300 km
187 miles

Airfield2

T4

T3

M1
M3

A2

M2

BATTLE THEATER

Figure 3 – 6 Map of Defense System of the Battle Theater

MISSILE
M1
M2
M3

RANGE
300 km
187 miles
600 km
373 miles
750 km
466 miles

Table 3 – 6 Missile Capabilities of the Battle Theater (36)
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3.7.5 Notional Operational Theater Scenarios
Four notional operational scenarios are created on a battle theater that is
defined in Figures 3-5 and 3-6 in order to show the recent usage of C3CMISR and tanker
aircrafts. By assumed data of the scenario, the aircraft circumstances are shown and
analyzed.
3.7.5.1 Notional Operational Scenario 1
In the first scenario, a package of fighter and bomber aircrafts
takes off from Airbase 1 (A1) and attack Target 1 (T1). T1 is a Command, Control and
Communication Facility (C3) as defined before and it has strategic importance. Its
coordinates are shown in Table 3-4. The attack package used in the scenario has a
notional number of fighter and bomber aircrafts. This number changes and is defined
with the type and requirements of the assigned mission. This data is classified and it is
declared to the exact operational units right before the mission is get started. So the
numbers of fighter and bomber aircrafts shown in the notional scenarios are just the
representations of these notional numbers. The missiles of the aircraft and their
capabilities are defined in Appendix F. After the attack and bombing of T1, it leaves the
battle theater and turns back to the A1. T1 is not in the center of both 300 km/187 miles
diametric defense coverage airfields but it is included in the 600 km/373 miles and 750
km/466 miles diametric defense coverage of Missile 2 (M2) and Missile 3 (M3)
respectively.
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Figure 3 – 7 Map of Notional Operational Scenario 1
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For this scenario which is shown in Figure 3-7, since only one target is planned,
AWACS, Rivet Joint and Compass Call are assigned for the mission. The attack package
needs AWACS support over the entire mission for identification of counter attack. The
AWACS radar range is 250 miles/355.5 km, so it has to achieve its task within the range
near the target. Because the AWACS orbit is inside the defense coverage range of two
missiles M1 and M2, escort fighter aircraft must accompany the AWACS aircraft. Also a
Compass Call aircraft is needed for jamming in order to protect the fighter package and
AWACS through the flight until reaching the target and achieving the mission. It can
operate outside the range of the missile defense coverage, so it doesn’t require any
dedicated escort fighter aircraft. Target 1 is tracked by the Rivet Joint aircraft and it flies
within the missile defense coverage because its radar range is 155 miles/240 km. So it
also requires fighter escorts. A Tanker aircraft is following a pattern out of the missile
defense area. For an operation, a Tanker Aircraft is an essential unit. Capabilities of
legacy C3CMISR aircrafts are shown in Appendix G.
3.7.5.2 Notional Operational Scenario 2
In the second scenario, a fighter and bomber aircraft package takes
off from airbase A2 and follows a task route in sequence to T4, T3 and T5 and then
proceeds to airbase A1. After bombing target T3 the fighter aircrafts air refueled. All of
the aircrafts have critical TOTs (Time on Target) for each target which must be achieved
for the mission to be successful.
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Figure 3 – 8 Map of Notional Operational Scenario 2
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The basic map of Operational Scenario 2 is shown in Figure 3-8. T3 is an
offensive counter air installation facility (OCA). T4 is a surface-to-air missile installation
facility (SAM). T5 is a ground order of battle (GOB) field. The coordinates of each target
are shown in Table 3-4. Targets T3, T4 and T5 are within all three battle theater defense
missiles coverage. T3 and T4 are within the air defense of airfield 2 and T5 is within the
air defense of airfield 1. Both airfields have same diametric coverage. The battle theater
is capable of using all three missiles M1, M2 and M3. By taking this fact into
consideration, all battlefield operational tasks must be planned carefully.
The distance between A2 and target T4 is 105 miles/170 km. Before and over T4,
AWACS aircraft provides airborne tracking and warning for the attack package and all
the friendly aircrafts through the flight mission route. After getting over T4, while aircraft
package does its mission, AWACS aircraft keeps track of all the friendly and foe aircrafts
and airborne activities. Because of its range, which is 250 miles/355.5 km, AWACS
aircraft doesn’t have to redo its orbit route while the aircraft package follows its mission
flight route. It flies over southwest of T4, within the 250 miles diameter which includes
both A2 and T4. Because of being within the battle theater defense missile coverage, it
needs to be escorted by fighter aircrafts. The Rivet Joint aircraft is needed for
reconnaissance of the targets. Its range is 155 miles/240 km and it also has to fly within
the target defense missile coverage. So it definitely needs escort fighter aircrafts. The
distance between A2 and T4 is not exceeds Rivet Joint aircraft’s range, so it flies over the
north of T4 and the orbit diameter of 155 miles includes both A2 and T4. For a strict and
effective attack to the target and achieving the mission, a Compass Call aircraft is needed.
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Mainly it provides jamming for the friendly units. It also has escorts fighter aircrafts for
being within the defense coverage. The Compass Call aircraft flies over the northeast of
T4.
The distance between the targets T4 and T3 is 63 miles/102 km, which is a very
short range. After attacking the targets at T4, the package proceeds to T3. Because of the
short distance between targets, none of the C3CMISR aircrafts need to change their orbit
position. Their radar ranges allow them to achieve their planned tasks. They provide
requested information, intelligence, reconnaissance and jamming during the attack over
T3.
After the attack over T3, the fighter aircrafts need to be refueled. A tanker aircraft
flies out of the target area with escort fighter aircraft. The fighter aircraft do air refueling.
After air refueling, the attack package gathers and moves towards target T5. On T5 there
is a ground battle is in progress and the fighter aircraft are scheduled to attack and bomb
ground moving targets. Since they are not fixed targets, a Joint STAR aircraft is needed
for this mission. The radar range of the JSTAR aircraft is 160 miles/250 km. So it flies
over west of T5 within its radar range and provides ground target tracking information.
The distance between T3 and T5 is 403 miles/649 km. So the C3CMISR aircrafts need to
relocate their orbit positions for the mission over T5. The AWACS aircraft keeps
providing airborne intelligence and data while the attack package flies through their
mission route towards T5. It especially gives information about the counter attack
aircrafts and missiles of the battle theater. Through out the whole operation an ABCCC
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aircraft provides all of the command, control and communication issues of the scenario
theater. It flies inside the battle theater defense coverage and escorted by fighter aircraft.
After destroying the specified targets over T5, the package and all the C3CMISR
aircrafts leave the battle theater and proceed towards airbase A1. The distance between,
T5 and A1 is 390 miles/630 km. This is less then the distance between T5 and A2 which
is 525 miles/845 km. Because of this reason, the flight route is planned towards A1.
3.7.5.3 Notional Operational Scenario 3
In the third scenario, two different aircraft packages take off from
the same airbase and attack to two different targets at the same time. Aircraft package 1
takes off from airbase A1 and is headed towards target T5, and aircraft package 2 takes
off from airbase A1 and is headed towards target T2. Concurrently, a jamming aircraft,
Compass Call, also takes off from A1 and heads towards target T1. This notional
operational scenario consists of three inclusive tasks that each one must be accomplished
individually.
The basic map of Scenario 3 is shown in Figure 3-9.
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Figure 3 – 9 Map of Notional Operational Scenario 3
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T1 is a command, control and communication (C3) facility. T2 is a military
industrial base (MIB) facility. T5 is a ground order of battle (GOB) field. The coordinates
of each targets are shown in Table 3-4. T1 is within the battle theater defense coverage of
missiles M2 and M3 of airfield 1 and M3 of airfield 2. T2 is within the coverage of
missile M3 of airfield 1. T5 is within the coverage of missiles M1, M2 and M3 of airfield
1.
At T5 a ground battlefield in progress and ground moving targets exist. For this
mission an AWACS aircraft should follow the mission route of the aircraft package along
that leg of the mission for A2 to T5 to provide airborne intelligence and warning
continuously. It then orbits north of T5 within its radar range of 250 miles/355.5 km. A
Joint Star aircraft flies over the west of T5 which is within its radar range of 160
miles/250 km. A tanker aircraft flies northwest of the target T5. All C3CMISR aircrafts
and the tanker aircraft have escort fighter aircrafts, because of being inside the battle
theater defense missile system.
At the same time for aircraft package 2 attacking target T2, an AWACS aircraft is
also needed. The distance between A1 and T2 is 440 miles/710 km and the distance
between T5 and T2 is 251 miles/404 km. Since airborne intelligence is needed
continuously for the aircraft package 2, one AWACS aircraft cannot achieve both
missions. So another AWACS aircraft is assigned for the second mission. It provides
airborne data to the aircraft package 2 through its flight route. After the package comes
over T2, AWACS aircraft takes position and flies over north of T2 within its radar range.
For the target reconnaissance, a Rivet Joint aircraft is assigned for the second mission. T2
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is a fixed target, so Joint Stars aircraft is not included. A Compass Call aircraft is
assigned for jamming because of the target country defense and communications system.
It flies over the northeast of T2. For the mission continuity, a tanker aircraft is needed for
the second mission. Since the distance between T5 and T2 is far and both missions over
targets might require air refueling, another tanker aircraft is assigned for the second
mission. It flies over east of T2. Over this target T2, AWACS and Rivet Joint aircrafts
have escort fighter aircrafts. Compass Call and tanker aircrafts don’t have any, because
their fly out of the battle theater defense missile system.
While the aircraft packages are bombing targets T5 and T2, a Compass Call
aircraft jams over target T1. By jamming T1, the effect of command, control and
communications is prevented over T5 and T2. The distance between T1 and T2 is 212
miles/400 km. Because of this wide range, a second Compass Call aircraft is assigned for
T1. It also jams T5 and protected by escort fighter aircrafts. An ABCCC aircraft is
assigned for the whole scenario as a command, control and communications aircraft.
After the missions are achieved, all C3CMISR and fighter aircrafts leave the
battle theater and land to the airbase A1.
3.7.5.4 Notional Operational Scenario 4
In scenario 4, two fighter and bomber aircrafts package take off
from airbase A2 in order to bomb targets T3 and T4 respectively and one package takes
off from airbase A1 in order to bomb T5. And while the packages are bombing the
targets, a Compass Call aircraft is jamming the target T1.
The basic map of the scenario 4 is shown in Figure 3-10.
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Figure 3 – 10 Map of Notional Operational Scenario 4
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T1 is a command, control and communication (C3) facility. T3 is an offensive
counter air installation facility (OCA). T4 is a surface-to-air missile installation facility
(SAM). T5 is a ground order of battle (GOB) field. The coordinates of each target are
shown in Table 3-4. T3 and T4 are within the battle theater defense missiles M1, M2, and
M3 coverage of airfield 2. T1 is within the battle theater defense coverage of missiles M2
and M3 of airfield 1 and M3 of airfield 2. T5 is within the coverage of missiles M1, M2
and M3 of airfield 1.
The distance between A2 and T4 is 105 miles/170 km. An AWACS aircraft and a
Rivet Joint aircraft are assigned for airborne tracking and target reconnaissance. Since the
distance is within these aircrafts’ radar range, they fly over the north and northeast of T4
respectively. They can achieve the mission tasks from these points. The distance between
A2 and T3 is 130 miles/ 590 km, and the distance between T3 and T4 is 63 miles/102 km.
Both distances are within the radar range of AWACS and Rivet Joint aircrafts, so the
exact orbit positions of these aircrafts are suitable for the second attack mission over T3.
A single Joint Stars aircraft is assigned for both missions and it achieves the mission over
the southwest of target T3. Because its radar range is 160 miles/250 km, it provides data
for both missions over T3 and T4. All the C3CMISR aircrafts are within the battle theater
defense missile coverage and they all need escort fighter aircrafts. Also a Compass Call
aircraft is assigned for jamming the target T1 in order to prevent the target country’s
command, control and communication issues. The distance between A2 and T1 is 370
miles/ 590 km. The Compass Call aircraft flies over south of target T1 and this allows it
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to does jamming over targets T3 and T4 also. A tanker aircraft flies over the west of
targets T3 and T4 while the missions go on.
Besides missions over targets T1, T3 and T4 at the same time a fighter and
bomber aircrafts package takes off from airbase A1 and attacks to target T5. The distance
between A1 and T5 is 580 miles/950 km, so an AWACS aircraft follows the flight route
of the package until it comes over the target T5. After the package arrives to T5, AWACS
aircraft starts its orbit route over north of T5 within its radar range. Clearly, this is the
second AWACS aircraft assigned for the notional operational scenario. Because target T5
is a ground battlefield, a Joint Stars aircraft is assigned for the ground surveillance tasks
of the mission. This has to be the second Joint Stars aircraft in the scenario theater as
AWACS aircraft, because its radar range doesn’t allow it to provide data for all target
locations. Besides, a second Rivet Joint aircraft is needed for target reconnaissance over
T5.The Joint Stars aircraft flies over west of T5 and the Rivet Joint aircraft flies over
south of T5. For the long range of the mission from airbase A1 and the possible duration
of the mission, a tanker aircraft is assigned and it flies over northwest of T5. All of the
C3CMISR and tanker aircrafts fly inside the battle theater defense missile coverage and
they are escorted by fighter aircrafts. A Compass Call aircraft is assigned for jamming
over T5 in order to prevent command, control and communications issues of the enemy
ground units. It flies over northeast of T5.
All these missions and aircrafts are controlled and directed by an ABCCC aircraft
which flies in the middle of the scenario theater.
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Chapter 4 – Results and Analysis
4.1 Chapter Overview
In this chapter, the MMA design feasibility is studied by using notional scenarios
over a battle theater. In order to study the feasible MMA design, alternative MMA
architectures are defined. These different MMA designs are studied in notional
operational scenarios which are defined in chapter 3. The study includes alternative
architecture operational

effectiveness,

payload

limitations

and electromagnetic

compatibility and interference in the exact same notional operational theaters with the
same threats in the battle theater.
4.2 Alternative MMA Architectures
The best way of analyzing the MMA design from the operational viewpoint is to
create a notional operational theater and make up few warfare scenarios in order to
exercise the range of applications of C3CMISR aircraft. Basically two alternative MMA
architectures are defined. These are one tail number (OTN) and different tail numbers
(DTN). In OTN, all of the C3CMISR aircrafts are put on one airframe. This one airframe
includes all the sensors and mission crew inside it. The payload has to include everything
that is needed to achieve the missions of C3CMISR aircrafts. The DTN is formed by two
aircrafts and these aircraft frames include payload and sensors of alternatively chosen
C3CMISR aircrafts in four different combinations. The definitions of alternative MMA
architectures are given in Table 4-1.
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MMA
ARCHITECTURE

TITLE

CAPABILITIES
AWACS
JSTARS

ONE TAIL NUMBER

OTN

RIVET JOINT
ABCCC
COMPASS CALL

DTN11
DTN1

AWACS
JSTARS
RIVET JOINT

DTN12

ABCCC
COMPASS CALL

DTN21

AWACS
ABCCC

DTN2
DIFFERENT TAIL

JSTARS
DTN22

NUMBERS

RIVET JOINT
COMPASS CALL

DTN31

AWACS
RIVET JOINT

DTN3

JSTARS
DTN32

COMPASS CALL
ABCCC

DTN41

AWACS
COMPASS CALL

DTN4

DTN42

JSTARS
RIVET JOINT
ABCCC

Table 4 -1 Alternative MMA Architectures
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4.2.1 Notional Operational Scenario 1
Scenario 1 is a very basic attack plan. A fighter and bomber aircraft
package takes off from airbase A1 and hits the target T1. Target T1 is a command,
control and communication (C3) facility. The numbers of fighter and bomber aircrafts are
notional. After the mission is completed the package turns back to A1. While the aircraft
package flies through its attack route, it needs continuous airborne tracking and warning.
The attack route is within the battle theater defense missiles coverage and their ranges are
373 miles/600 km and 466 miles/750 km respectively. Besides defense missiles, the
battle theater uses intercept fighter aircrafts in order to block the attacking aircrafts by
engagement. In order to track all of these foe activities, an airborne tracking and warning
system must be used. After coming over the target T1, a reconnaissance system is
needed. While the friendly fighter and bomber aircrafts are attacking the specified targets
over T1, the foe signal intelligence and the targets’ reconnaissance is needed. A tanker
aircraft is also requested for air refueling in order to completely achieve the mission. By
in-flight refueling, the duration of the mission and the mission capabilities of the aircrafts
are increased.
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4.2.1.1 Notional Operational Scenario 1a
In Scenario 1a, MMA architecture as defined in table 3, OTN is

used. The mission operators are also needed to be specified. This number is determined
by taking the essential number of each specialized task for each C3CMISR aircraft. The
crew numbers and their specialties are listed in Appendix H. The total crew number is
calculated by adding a number of 4 flight crew to the number of operators needed. These
numbers are defined by the operational requirements of the C3CMISR architecture. The
titles and capabilities of alternative MMA architectures are listed in Appendix I.
The fighter and bomber aircraft package takes off from airbase A1 and follows
the attack route through target T1. The distance between A1 and T1 is 580 miles/950 km.
This distance is out of the OTN aircraft’s radar range. This radar range formed by the
constraint of AWACS, RIVET JOINT, JSTARS, ABCCC and COMPASS CALL sensor
ranges. When each sensor is in use, the range of its sensor is taken as a range of OTN.
Because of airborne attack and warning tracking needs, OTN aircraft follows the attack
route through T1 with the package and provides real-time intelligence data to the
operational units. After arriving over T1, the package starts its mission and OTN aircraft
forms an orbit over the north of T1 within its radar range. Even though AWACS has a
radar range of 250 miles/355.5 km and JSTARS has a range of 160 miles/250 km, the
radar range of OTN is constrained into 155 miles/240 km because of RIVET JOINT’s
radar range. OTN aircraft’s mission is now; provide airborne tracking and warning, target
surveillance and signals intelligence collection, and jamming of foe activities. The OTN
aircraft must accomplish its tasks within the target country defense missile coverage, so it
is escorted by fighter aircrafts. With this OTN combination, the notional numbers of
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escort fighter aircrafts are decreased to 1 in 3 compared to the Scenario 1 which is
achieved by individual aircrafts. This brings an important effect about cost and risk
issues.
This scenario can be achieved by one OTN aircraft, because it only requires a
single target tracking and surveillance. One tanker aircraft flies out of the defense missile
coverage in case of any air refueling needs for completion of the mission. It doesn’t
require any escort fighter aircrafts.
After the mission achieved over T1, the package and OTN aircraft leaves the
target area and heads through A1. OTN keeps providing airborne tracking and warning
data for the operational units in case of a foe activity and command and control issues.
All the operational units and aircrafts land on airbase A1.
The basic map of Scenario 1a is shown in Figure 4-1.
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Figure 4 -1 Map of Notional Operational Scenario 1a
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4.2.1.2 Notional Operational Scenario 1b
In Scenario 1b, different tail number (DTN) is used as an
alternative MMA architecture. As it can be seen from the Table 4-1, the alternative DTN
architectures are formed by two airframes. The first airframe fixed capability is AWACS
and the other sensor and capabilities on board change. The capabilities on second
airframe are changing according to the first airframe.
With the distance between A1 and T1 which is 580 miles/950 km, first airframe
of DTN architectures follows the fighter and bomber aircraft package through its attack
route. The radar ranges of different DTN airframes are formed by the radars and sensors
on board and they are shown in Appendix H with the specialties of operators and their
numbers for the architectures. The DTN airframes capabilities are listed in Appendix I.
While the package flies on its attack route, the first airframe of DTN architectures
provides only airborne tracking and warning to the operational units. There is no need for
ground surveillance at this point.
After arriving over T1, the first airframe of DTN architectures forms an orbit
route over northwest of T1 within its radar range. The first airframe of DTN architectures
provides real-time airborne surveillance and command, and the other C3CMISR issue on
board. At the same time, the second airframe of DTN architectures flies over the
northeast of T1 and provides the C3CMISR capabilities on board. Both architectures are
within the target country defense missile coverage, and they need escort fighter aircrafts.
This time the notional numbers of these fighter aircrafts are decreased to 2 in 3, compared
to the Scenario 1 which is achieved by individual aircrafts which is an improvement in
cost and risk issues of the operation.
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A tanker aircraft flies over the northeast of T1, out of defense missile coverage.
All aircrafts get air refueling if there exists any need in order to achieve the required
mission. No fighter aircraft is needed for escort the tanker aircraft.
After the mission is completed, all aircrafts leave the target area and head through
the airbase A1. On the flight route of the aircraft package, the first airframe of DTN
architectures provides airborne surveillance for the operational units and command and
control issues. All the operational units and aircrafts land on airbase A1.
The basic map of scenario 1b is shown in Figure 4-2.
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Figure 4 -2 Map of Notional Operational Scenario 1b

69

4.2.2 Notional Operational Scenario 2
Scenario 2 includes three different target points. These target points are
attacked by a fighter and bomber aircraft package. Numbers of these aircrafts are notional
because they are mostly classified and specified according to the mission requirements.
The only clue can be given about this issue is; the number of fighter and bomber aircrafts
required for Scenario 2 is more than required number for Scenario 1. Because in Scenario
2, there are 3 targets and the mission includes continuous tasks that followed by each
other. Also the time requested for the mission completion is more than Scenario 1. This
leads to exact air refueling requirements which causes more intervals in the mission. The
increase in the number of aircrafts prevents this interval for blocking the mission
achievement in case of risk assessment. The attack package takes off from airbase A2 and
flies through target T4 first. The distance between A2 and T4 is 105 miles/170 km. After
the accomplishment of the task over T4, the package proceeds towards target T3. The
distance between T4 and T3 is 63 miles/102 km. The package proceeds towards target T5
after the assigned task is achieved over T3. Target T4 is a surface-to-air missile (SAM)
installation facility, T3 is an offensive counter air (OCA) installation facility and T5 is a
ground order of battle (GOB) field. After the completion of the task over T5, all aircrafts
leave the target country and land on airbase A1. This is because the distance between T5
and A1 is less then the distance between T5 and A2. They are 390 miles/630 km and 403
miles/649 km respectively. The shorter distance lessens the risk issues.
The three targets are located within different battle theater defense missile
coverage. Targets T3, T4 and T5 are within three missiles M1, M2 and M3 coverage
which have ranges of 187 miles/300 km, 373 miles/600 km and 466 miles/750 km
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respectively. The target country defense coverage has two main airfields, which are
Airfield 1 and Airfield 2. T3 and T4 are within Airfield 2. Target T5 is within Airfield 1.
Scenario 2 requires continuous airborne surveillance, command, control and
communications issues and jamming. Since all the operation takes place within a highly
defended enemy field, C3 CMISR and escort fighter aircrafts needs are at the high level.
Because of a continuing task over the scenario theater, a tanker aircraft is needed in order
to provide air refueling for the aircrafts to increase their endurance.
4.2.2.1 Notional Operational Scenario 2a
In Scenario 2a, one tail number (OTN) is used as an alternative
MMA architecture. The crew number is defined by taking the essential amount of the
specialists needed for the required task and it is show in Appendix H.
The distance between A2 and T4 allows OTN to fly over the north of T4 and wait
for the fighter and bomber aircraft package. The package takes off from airbase A2 and
follows an attack route through target T4. The radar range of OTN is 155 miles/240 km
because this is the radar range of RIVET JOINT and it has the lowest value within all
C3CMISR aircraft sensor ranges. The radar range of OTN covers the attack route and it
provides continuous airborne surveillance, command, control and communications issues,
airborne tracking and warning, jamming and airborne reconnaissance for the operational
units. Since T3 and T4 are fixed targets, the tasks over them require AWACS, RIVET
JOINT, COMPASS CALL, and ABCCC.
After the attack package arrives over T4, OTN provides real-time on-scene
C3CMISR data to the operational units. After the completion of the task over T4, the
package proceeds towards T3. The distance between T4 and T3 is within OTN radar
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range so it still provides continuous data for required needs. After T3, the package heads
to target T5. The distance between T3 and T5 is out of OTN radar range, so it follows the
package throughout the attack route towards T5. Within the mission, in according to the
necessity and to keep the aircrafts’ endurance convenient to the tasks, air refueling is
required. For this purpose, a tanker aircraft is assigned and it flies 100 miles west of the
attack route and 100 miles north east of T3.
The tanker and OTN aircrafts require escort fighter aircrafts because of being
within the enemy defense missile coverage. In Scenario 2a, the assigned number of escort
aircrafts is decreased to 1 in 5 of the number assigned for the Scenario 2 which is
achieved with five different tail numbers of C3CMISR aircrafts. This is a great
improvement for the risk and cost assessment of the operation.Target T5 has moving
ground targets and it requires ground surveillance. At T5, all C3CMISR capabilities are
needed.
The basic map of Scenario 2a is shown in Figure 4-3.
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Figure 4 -3 Map of Notional Operational Scenario 2a
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4.2.2.2 Notional Operational Scenario 2b
Different Tail Number (DTN) is used as an alternative MMA
architecture in Scenario 2b. DTN includes four different MMA architectures formed by
two airframes includes different C3CMISR aircraft capabilities. The C3CMISR
capabilities and the crew numbers of the DTN architectures are shown in Appendixes I
and H respectively.
The distances between A2 and T3, and T3 and T4 are allows the first and second
airframes of DTN architectures to form an orbit and wait for the attack package to take
off from A2 and flies through the targets. After the attack package arrives over the target
T4, they provide airborne surveillance, target reconnaissance, command, control and
C3CMISR capabilities on board to the operational units. After bombing over the target
T4, all the attack units proceed towards target T3 and the C3CMISR aircrafts keep
providing required tasks to the operational units.
The distance between T3 and T5 is 403 miles/649 km and between this route, a
tanker aircrafts flies in order to provide air refueling to the required operational units for
the endurance of the mission. While the attack package flies through the target T5, the
first airframe of DTN architectures keeps providing airborne surveillance, attack and
warning issues. After the package arrives over T5, the DTN architectures set flight orbits
over T5, in order to achieve their tasks. Over T5, all five C3CMISR capabilities,
especially the ground moving target surveillance, are required because it is a ground
order of battle field.
All of the C3CMISR and tanker aircrafts need escort fighter aircrafts because of
being within the target country defense missile system but the notional number is less.
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The decrease in the number of escort fighter aircrafts required for DTN architectures is 2
in 5 and it is a benefit for risk and cost issues. After the mission is accomplish over T5,
all the operational units leave the target country and proceed to airbase A1.
The basic map of Scenario 2b is shown in Figure 4-4.
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Figure 4 - 4 Map of Notional Operational Scenario 2b
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4.2.3 Notional Operational Scenario 3
In Scenario 3, there are three different targets which are T1, T2 and T5.
Target T1 is a command, control and communication facility (C3), target T2 is a military
industrial base (MIB) facility and target T5 is a ground order of battle (GOB) field. In
this scenario two fighter and bomber aircrafts packages are assigned, because the targets
T2 and T5 are attacked at the same time. The Attack Package 1 and Attack Package 2
take off from airbase A1 and fly through targets T5 and T2 respectively. Besides these,
target T1 is jammed in order to prevent command, control and communications activities
of the enemy while the packages are hitting the targets. The distance between A1 and T2
is 440 miles/710 km, and the distance between A1 and T5 is 390 miles/630 km. Both
targets require airborne surveillance, tracking and warning, command, control and
communications, and jamming. The only differences between target C3CMISR capability
requirements are the ground surveillance need over target T5 and target reconnaissance
need over target T2. T5 is a ground order of battle field and requires ground moving
target tracking and T2 is a fixed ground target. Over T5, Rivet JOINT capability is not
required and over T2, JSTARS capability is not required. Target T1 requires only
jamming capability of C3CMISR aircrafts. Because of the two different targets T2 and
T5 and their distance from each other which is 251 miles/404 km, two tanker aircrafts are
assigned for keeping the mission endurance in order to succeed.
Target T2 is within the battle theater defense missile M3 coverage which has a
373 miles/600 km diametric range. Target T5 is within missiles M1, M2 and M3 which
have 187 miles/300 km, 373 miles/600 km and 466 miles/750 km diametric ranges
respectively. T2 and T5 are within defense airfield 1. Target T1 is within the 466
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miles/750 km diametric ranged missile M3 of defense airfield 2 and 373 miles/600 km
and 466 miles/750 km diametric ranged missiles M2 and M3 of defense airfield 2.
Besides these defense missiles, target country uses intercept fighter aircrafts in order to
block the friendly attack aircrafts by engagement. All C3CMISR and tanker aircrafts
require escort fighter aircrafts against enemy threat.
4.2.3.1 Notional Operational Scenario 3a
In Scenario 3a, one tail number (OTN) is used as an alternative
MMA architecture.
The Attack Package 1 takes off from airbase A1 and proceeds towards the
target T5. Its mission is hitting the ground order of battle field and destroying the ground
moving targets and strategic points. The mostly required C3CMISR capabilities over T5
are AWACS and JSTARS. AWACS capability provides airborne surveillance, tracking
and warning, and JSTARS capability provides ground surveillance. Besides jamming,
command, control and communication issues are also required. Because of the distance,
OTN1 follows the Attack Package 1 through its flight route. After the Package 1 arrives
to T5, OTN1 form an orbit route over the east of T5 within its radar range. The Tanker
Aircraft1 flies over the northwest of T5 for this task in order to provide in-flight refueling
to the operational units to keep them operable throughout the mission.
To hit the target T2, the Attack Package 2 takes off from airbase A1 and proceeds
to the target. Over T2, four C3CMISR capabilities of airborne surveillance, command,
control and communications, target reconnaissance and jamming are required. Only
ground moving target surveillance is not needed over T2. The distance between target T5
and target T2 is 251 miles/404 km. Because of this distance, one OTN cannot be able to
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cover both targets T5 and T2 at the same time. For T2, a second OTN that is OTN2 is
required and it moves with the Attack Package 2 throughout the mission. After the Attack
Package 2 arrives over T2, the OTN2 flies over east of T2 and provides the required
C3CMISR data to the operational units of the mission. The Tanker Aircraft2 flies over
the southeast of T2 in order to provide air refueling to the friendly aircrafts. The distance
between T2 and T5 affects the required tanker number for the mission. For the
accomplishment of the mission two tanker aircrafts are assigned.
While attack packages are hitting the targets T5 and T2, target T1 needs to be
done ineffective. Target T1 is a command, control and communication facility. By
jamming target T1, ground command, control and communications capabilities of the
target country is done ineffective. This achievement helps the tasks over T5 and T2. Over
T1, a COMPASS CALL capability is required. For this purpose, the OTN1 is assigned.
While it flies for the target T5, it also provides jamming for the target T1, because the
distance between T5 and T1 is 218 miles/351 km. The OTN1 flies at most 160 miles east
of the target T5 and the remaining distance allows it to provide the required task for T1.
All of the C3CMISR and tanker aircrafts are within the enemy country defense
system and they all require escort fighter aircrafts. Compared with the Scenario 3 which
requires escorts for 9 aircrafts, in Scenario 3a fighter escorts are required for only 4
aircrafts. According to the decreased ratio in escorts, a great advantage is gained in the
cost and risk issues in this Scenario.
From the operational side, this Scenario is achievable only if two one tail number
MMA architectures and two tanker aircrafts are assigned for the operation.
The basic map of Scenario 3a is shown in Figure 4-5.
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Figure 4 - 5 Map of Notional Operational Scenario 3a
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4.2.3.2 Notional Operational Scenario 3b
In Scenario 3b, different tail numbers (DTN) 1, 2 and 3 are used as
an alternative MMA architecture.
In Scenario 3b, the Attack Package 1 and Attack Package 2 take off from A1 and
head towards T5 and T2 respectively. Because of the distances between A1 with T5 and
T2, and the distance between T5 and T2, two DTN architectures apiece are required for
the mission. Besides two tanker aircrafts are needed for the in-flight refueling over the
targets. For the sake of clarity, the first and second airframes of DTN architectures
proceeds with Attack Package 1 are defined as DTN1a and DTN1b, and DTN
architectures with Package 2 are defined as DTN2a and DTN2b on the map of the
Scenarios 3b.
While Attack Package 1 is hitting the target T5, DTN1a and DTN1b provide
required C3CMISR capabilities. DTN1b flies over the east of T5 and DTN1a flies over
the northwest of T5 within their radar ranges. The Tanker Aircraft 1 flies over the
southwest of T5 for air refueling. DTN2a and DTN2b also provide required C3CMISR
capabilities for the Attack Package 2 over the target T2. The radar range of DTN2a flies
over the north of T2 and DTN2a flies over the east of T2. Besides, the Tanker Aircraft 2
flies over the northeast of T2. As a third mission in Scenario 3b, target T1 is jammed by
DTN1b which flies over T5. The distance between T5 and T1 is acceptable by DTN1b’s
radar range. This jamming provides the operational units to achieve their tasks without
the interception of command, control and communications issues of the enemy country.
All of the C3CMISR and tanker aircrafts are escorted by fighter aircrafts. The
notional numbers of these escorts assigned in Scenario 3b are less then assigned in
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Scenario 3. In Scenario 3, there are 9 aircrafts requires escorts and in Scenario 3b there
are 6 aircrafts require escorts.
The basic map of Scenario 3b is shown in Figure 4-6.
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Figure 4 - 6 Map of Notional Operational Scenario 3b
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4.2.3.3 Notional Operational Scenario 3c
In Scenario 3e, different tail numbers (DTN) 4 is used as an
alternative MMA architecture.
Basically, the Scenario 3c tasks are similar to the ones assigned in Scenario 3b.
The only difference in the arrangement of the scenario map is the change in the flight
orbits of DTN1a and DTN1b. For target T1, COMPASS CALL capability is required in
order to achieve jamming. In DTN4 architecture, DTN41 has this capability on board. In
the map of Scenario 3c, DTN1a and DTN1b provide C3CMISR data over target T5. In
this scenario, DTN1a flies over the east of T5 instead of DTN1b. Now, DTN1a provides
jamming over target T2. The radar range of DTN1a is 250 miles/355.5 km and the range
of DTN1b is 155 miles/240 km in Scenario 3c.
The basic map of Scenario 3c is shown in Figure 4-7.
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Figure 4 - 7 Map of Notional Operational Scenario 3c
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4.2.4 Notional Operational Scenario 4
In Scenario 4, there are four different targets and three different fighter
and bomber aircrafts packages take off from two different airbases. All the packages act
and achieve their tasks at the same time. Attack packages 1 and 2 take off from airbase
A2 and hit the targets T3, T4 and T1. Attack package 3 takes off from airbase A1 and hits
the target T5. Target T1 is a command, control and communication (C3) facility, target
T3 is an offensive counter air installation (OCA) facility, target T4 is a surface-to-missile
(SAM) installation, and Target T5 is a ground order of battle (GOB) field. While the
attack packages hit the targets, one jamming aircraft makes the target T1 ineffective. This
prevents the command, control and communications activities of the target country.
The distance between A1 and T5 is 580 miles/950 km, the distances between A2
and T3, T1 and T4 are 130 miles/210 km, 370 miles/590 km and 105 miles/170 km
respectively. All of the targets T5, T3 and T4 require airborne tracking, warning and
surveillance, command, control and communications, target reconnaissance and jamming.
Additional to these C3CMISR capabilities, ground surveillance is required over target T5
and jamming is required over target T1. Two tanker aircrafts are assigned for the mission,
because there are mainly two different target areas and they are covered within a wide
area.
Targets T3, T4 and T5 are within three missiles M1, M2 and M3 coverage which
have ranges of 187 miles/300 km, 373 miles/600 km and 466 miles/750 km respectively.
The target country defense coverage has two main airfields, which are Airfield 1 and
Airfield 2. T3 and T4 are within Airfield 2. Target T5 is within Airfield 1. Target T1 is
within the 466 miles/750 km diametric ranged missile M3 of defense airfield 2 and 373
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miles/600 km and 466 miles/750 km diametric ranged missiles M2 and M3 of defense
airfield 2. Besides these defense missiles, target country also sends its interceptor
aircrafts against the friendly aircrafts and operational units. Because of this highly enemy
defensive risk, all of the friendly C3CMISR and tanker aircrafts require escort fighter
aircrafts throughout the mission.
4.2.4.1 Fictitious Operational Scenario 4a
In Scenario 4a, one tail number (OTN) is used as an alternative
MMA architecture.
Attack Package 1 takes off from airbase A2 and proceeds towards target T4. The
distance between A2 and T4 is 105 miles/170 km. The radar range of OTN is 155
miles/240 km and it covers the distance between A2 and T4. It flies over the north
of T4 and provides airborne surveillance, target reconnaissance, command,
control and communications and jamming to the operational units over the area.
The Attack Package 2 takes off from airbase A2 also and proceeds towards target
T3. The OTN architecture is capable enough to cover all the area over targets T3
and T4. The OTN architecture which is assigned for the targets T3 and T4 is
defined as OTN1. While the Attack Package 1 and Attack Package 2 are hitting
the targets T3 and T4, OTN1 is providing real-time on-scene data for the required
operational units. For the mission endurance, a tanker aircraft is assigned over the
southwest of target T3. This tanker aircraft is defined as Tanker Aircraft 1.
The attack Package 3 takes off from airbase A1 and proceeds towards target T5.
The distance between A1 and T5 is 580 miles/950 km which can not be covered by a
OTN architecture. The distance between targets T5 and T3 is 403 miles/649 km and the
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distance between T5 and T4 is 461 miles/742 km. The radar range of OTN1 can not
cover these distances. So, another OTN architecture is assigned for the C3CMISR
requirements of target T5. The second OTN architecture is defined as OTN2. OTN2
provides airborne surveillance to the Attack Package 3 on their attack route and it follows
the package through out the route. After the package arrives over T5, it forms an orbit
over the east of T5 and provides airborne surveillance, ground surveillance, command,
control and communications and jamming for the operational units. And also for the
endurance of aircrafts over the target T5, there is another tanker aircraft is assigned. This
is defined as Tanker Aircraft 2.
As a fourth target, T1 is jammed in order to block the command, control and
communications activities of the target country while all the operational units achieving
their tasks over the defined targets in Scenario 4a. The distance between T5 and T1 is 218
miles/351 km, the distance between T4 and T1 is 283 miles/455 km, and the distance
between T3 and T1 is 239 miles/384 km. By taking the shortest distance which is the one
between T5 and T1, the OTN2 is also assigned for the jamming task over T1.
In Scenario 4a, the mission covers a wide area. As a main command, control and
communication unit a third OTN platform is assigned over the area. It flies between two
main mission regions which is between targets T5 and T3. The accomplishment of the
Scenario 4a at the operational level can be done by three OTN platforms only. The
C3CMISR platforms and tanker aircrafts require escort fighter aircrafts in order to
provide their defense against the target country defense system. In different tail numbered
Scenario 4, the notional numbers of the escort fighter aircrafts required for the 9 different
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C3CMISR and 2 tanker aircrafts are decreased to a requirement of only for 5 aircrafts in
Scenario 4a. This ensures a great benefit for cost and risk assessment in an operation.
The basic map of Scenario 4a is shown in Figure 4-8.
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Figure 4 - 8 Map of Notional Operational Scenario 4a
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4.2.4.2 Notional Operational Scenario 4b
Different tail numbers 1 (DTN1) is used as an alternative MMA
architecture in Scenario 4b.
In Scenario 4b, Attack Package 1 and Attack Package 2 take off from airbase A2
and hit the targets T4 and T3 respectively. One DTN1 architecture provides continuous
airborne surveillance, target reconnaissance, command, control and communications, and
jamming over the targets. Because of the complexity of the mission and need for
clarifying the tasks, the DTN11 and DTN12 are defined as DTN1a and DTN1b over the
targets T3 and T4. DTN1a flies over the north of target T4, and DTN1b flies over the
southeast of target T3. The radar ranges of DTN1a and DTN 1b are 160 miles/250 km
and 155 miles/240 km respectively. Both ranges cover the distances between T3 and A2,
and T4 and A2. Same as in Scenario 4a, the Tanker Aircraft 1 is assigned for the
endurance of the mission and it flies over the west of T3 for air refueling.
The Attack Package 3 takes off from airbase A1 and hits the target T5. Because of
the distances between the targets another DTN1 architecture is assigned for this region of
the target country. For clarification, DTN11 and DTN12 aircrafts are defined as DTN2a
and DTN2b over target T5. DTN 2a follows the Attack Package 3 throughout its attack
route until it gets over the target T5. DTN2b flies over the east of T5 and after the
package arrives over T5, DTN2a forms flight route over the northwest of T5. For
jamming task over T1, DTN2b is assigned. For the operation over T1, the Tanker Aircraft
2 is assigned for in-flight refueling.
For the whole operation over the battle theater, a main command, control and
communications platform is assigned. For this purpose, a DTN12 aircraft is assigned and
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it is defined as DTN3 for the clarification issues of the task. All of the C3CMISR and
tanker aircrafts require escort fighter aircrafts over the target country defense system. The
notional numbers of escort aircrafts decreased to a lesser number in Scenario 4b and this
ensures a fine amount of decrease in cost and risk issues.
At the operational level, this mission can be achieved by 2 DTN11 and 3 DTN12
aircrafts. And also 2 tanker aircrafts are needed in order to ensure the required endurance
of the mission completion.
The basic map of Scenario 4b is shown in Figure 4-9.
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Figure 4 - 9 Map of Notional Operational Scenarios 4b, 4d
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4.2.4.3 Notional Operational Scenario 4c
In Scenario 4c, the different tail numbers 2 (DTN2) is used as an
alternative MMA architecture.
The C3CMISR tasks over the targets T3 and T4 are achieved by the aircrafts
DTN21 and DTN22. The radar ranges of DTN21 and DTN22 are 250 miles/355.5 km
and 155 miles/240 km respectively. For clarification, DTN21 and DTN22 over the targets
T3 and T4 are defined as DTN1a and DTN1b. DTN1a flies over the north of T4 and
DTN1b flies over the southwest of T3. The Tanker Aircraft flies over the southeast of T3
and provides air refueling for the friendly aircrafts.
Over target T5, a second DTN2 architecture is assigned for C3CMISR tasks.
These DTN21 and DDTN22 aircrafts are defined as DTN2a and DTN2b for clarification.
DTN2a flies over the northwest of T5 and DTN2b flies over the east of T5. For the
jamming task over target T1, DTN2b is assigned. The Tanker Aircraft 2 is assigned for
air refueling and it flies over the southwest of T5.
For the whole mission area, a third DTN21 aircraft is assigned in order to achieve
command, control and communications activities. This C3 aircraft is defined as DTN3.
The notional escort fighter aircraft requirement for the C3CMISR and tanker aircrafts is
the same as in Scenario 4b. In Scenario 4c, the planned mission can be achieved by 3
DTN21 and 2 DTN22 aircrafts.
The basic map of Scenario 4c is shown in Figure 4-10.
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Figure 4 - 10 Map of Notional Operational Scenario 4c
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4.2.4.4 Notional Operational Scenario 4d
In Scenario 4d, different tail numbers 3 (DTN3) is used as an
alternative MMA architecture.
The tasks over targets are the same as above scenarios. Over targets T3 and T4, a
DTN3 architecture is assigned which is formed by DTN31 and DTN32 aircrafts. DTN31
and DTN32 over targets T3 and T4 are defined as DTN1a and DTN1b for clarification.
Over targets T5 and T1, a second DTN3 architecture is assigned. These DTN31 and
DTN32 aircrafts over T5 and T1 are defined as DTN2a and DTN2b for clarification. For
jamming over T1, DTN2b is assigned.
For the whole mission, a C3 aircraft which is another DTN32 is assigned. DTN32
is defined as DTN3. The escort fighter aircrafts numbers are the same as in Scenario 4b.
At the operational level, the mission can be completed with 2 DTN31 and 3 DTN32
aircrafts. Also 2 tanker aircrafts are required for the endurance of the mission.
The basic map of Scenario 4d is shown in Figure 4-9.
4.2.4.5 Notional Operational Scenario 4e
In Scenario 4e, different tail numbers 4 (DTN4) is assigned as an
alternative MMA architecture.
The attack packages 1 and 2 take off from airbase A2 and hit the targets T4 and
T3 respectively. For the tasks over T3 and T4, a DTN4 architecture is assigned which is
formed by DTN41 and DTN42 aircrafts. The radar ranges of DTN41 and DTN42 are 250
miles/355.5 km and 155 miles/240 km respectively. DTN41 and DTN42 aircrafts over T3
and T4 are defined as DTN1a and DTN1b for clarification. They provide required
C3CMISR capabilities over T3 and T4 to the operational units.
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The Attack Package 3 takes off from airbase A1 and hits the target T5. A second
DTN4 architecture is assigned for that task. DTN41 and DTN42 over T5 are defined as
DTN2a and DTN2b for clarification. DTN2a flies over the east of T5 and DTN2b flies
over the northwest of T5. DTN2a also provides jamming over the target T1.
For the whole mission, a C3 aircraft which is another DTN42 is assigned. DTN42
is defined as DTN3. The escort fighter aircrafts numbers are the same as in Scenario 4d.
At the operational level, the mission can be completed with 2 DTN41 and 3 DTN42
aircrafts. Also 2 tanker aircrafts are required for the endurance of the mission.
The basic map of Scenario 4e is shown in Figure 4-11.
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Figure 4 - 11 Map of Notional Operational Scenario 4e
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Chapter 5 – Discussion and Conclusions
5.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter basically defines the MMA design feasibility at three levels of
investigation which are operational, payload and electromagnetic interference. When the
alternative C3CMISR architectures are not feasible for the notional operational scenarios,
the achievement of the mission by UAV is defined.
5.2 Overall Evaluation of Alternative MMA Architectures
The notional operational scenarios are created in order to show the feasibility of
alternative MMA architectures in operational environments. The attained results from
these scenarios are shown in Table 5-1. When the alternative MMA architectures are
studied at the operational level, it can be seen that the feasibility and convenience of them
depend upon the operational scenario. In this study, there are basically four operational
scenarios. Each scenario requires different tasks and C3CMISR capabilities. In each
scenario the location of the targets are different and the mission routes are changing. The
target definitions are the main factor in determining the C3CMISR capabilities that are
required for the mission. At the main level, the distances between the targets and the
tasks are designating the required numbers of the MMA architectures. The radar ranges
and capabilities of the C3CMISR aircrafts are affecting the whole operation. As it is
shown in Table 5-1, some scenarios are more worthwhile by using MMA architectures
then the legacy system. In Scenario 1, three aircrafts are required for the mission, but
when OTN is used, the number of aircrafts is decreased in 1 to 3. Besides the C3CMISR
aircrafts, the number of the escort fighter aircrafts that provides the defense of these
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aircrafts is decreased. In Scenario 1, like OTN architecture, DTN architecture is also
valuable. Instead of assigning 3 C3CMISR aircrafts, by DTN11 and DTN12, only 2
aircrafts are assigned to the mission. In Scenario 2, the benefit of OTN and DTN
architectures is clearer. Instead of assigning 5 different aircrafts, by OTN only 1 aircraft
and by DTN only 2 aircrafts can achieve the mission. In Scenarios 3 and 4 the required
number of legacy aircrafts is comparably too much to the MMA architectures, but the
required MMA architectures are more than 1 and this situation is keeping the aim of
achieving the mission by 1 architecture out of the scope. At the design feasibility level
this is not the desired result. On the other hand, the decreased required number of MMA
aircrafts compared to the required number of legacy aircrafts in the operational theater,
brings the advantages of decreasing the notional number of defensive units.
In this study besides operational feasibility, the payload design and electro
magnetic interference are also considered as affective factors in the whole MMA design.
When the alternative MMA architectures are considered as a new design, they studied at
the payload and electro magnetic compatibility level and these studies lead to basic
results. The possibility of the alternative MMA architectures at the payload design and
electromagnetic compatibility levels are presented in Table 5-2. The payload data is
provided from the master thesis of 1Lt Ahmet Kahraman (TUAF) namely Multimission
Aircraft Design Study- Payload, and the electro magnetic compatibility data is provided
from the master thesis of Capt. Jenna Davis (USAF) namely Multimission Aircraft
Design Study- Electromagnetic Compatibility.
Even though the notional scenarios are achievable at the operational level, at the
payload design and electromagnetic compatibility levels the accomplishment of the most
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alternative MMA architecture design is not feasible. As it is presented in Table 5-2, the
one tail number (OTN) architecture is not feasible at both levels. From the payload
design side, the power limitation is exceeded and from the electromagnetic interference
side, the sensors on board are not compatible with each other. The other alternative
different tail numbers (DTN) architectures are all compatible at the electromagnetic level
but at the payload design level except DTN21 architecture, the all other DTN alternatives
are not feasible. All of them have power restrictions. At this point we can say that, only
DTN21 is feasible for MMA design, but this is not a solution that we are looking for. The
feasibility of DTN21 doesn’t cover all the C3CMISR capabilities on board so it can give
a solution for only the part of the problem. If the DTN21 is accepted then for an exact
completion of the operational needs, JSTARS, Rivet JOINT and COMPASS CALL must
be assigned individually as legacy systems to the required operational theaters. If this is
decided as an option to be designed, for another option of the legacy system would be
unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) in order to provide risk, cost and manpower issues.

Legacy System
Scenario
1

2

3

MMA Alternatives

Aircrafts

Required

Required

Number

AWACS

1

COMPASS CALL

1

Rivet JOINT

1

AWACS

1

COMPASS CALL

1

Rivet JOINT

1

Joint STARS

1

ABCCC

1

AWACS

2

Scenario

Alternatives

Required

Required

Number

1a

OTN

1

1b

DTN11

1

DTN12

1

DTN21

1

DTN22

1

DTN31

1

DTN32

1

DTN41

1

DTN42

1

1b
1b
1b
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3

4

COMPASS CALL

2

2a

OTN

1

Rivet JOINT

1

2b

DTN11

1

Joint STARS

1

DTN12

1

ABCCC

1

DTN21

1

AWACS

2

DTN22

1

COMPASS CALL

2

DTN31

1

Rivet JOINT

2

DTN32

1

Joint STARS

2

DTN41

1

ABCCC

1

DTN42

1

3a

OTN

2

3b

DTN11

2

DTN12

2

DTN21

2

DTN22

2

DTN31

2

DTN32

2

DTN41

2

DTN42

2

4a

OTN

3

4b

DTN11

2

DTN12

3

DTN21

3

DTN22

2

DTN31

2

DTN32

3

DTN41

2

DTN42

3

2b
2b
2b

3b
3b
3c

4c
4d
4e

Table 5 – 1 Attained Results from Notional Scenarios

PAYLOAD

EMAG

Architecture

Architecture

Alternative

A/C

Crew #

Power

Weight

Sensor

Type

Alternative

Title

on Board

Possibility

Possibility

Possibility

Compatibility

AWACS
One Tail

OTN

OTN

JSTARS
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Yes
YES

NO

YES

Yes

Number

OTN

OTN

Rivet JOINT

DTN1

DTN2

No

ABCCC

Yes

AWACS

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

JSTARS

Yes

Rivet JOINT

Yes
Yes

No

Yes

Yes

ABCCC
Overall

DTN21

Yes

Yes

C.CALL
DTN12

No

C.CALL

Overall
DTN11

Yes

AWACS

Yes
Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Assume Yes

ABCCC

Assume Yes

JSTARS

Yes

Different
Tail

DTN22

Rivet JOINT

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

C.CALL

Numbers

Overall
DTN31

DTN3

AWACS

DTN4
DTN42

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No
Yes

JSTARS

Assume Yes
Yes

No

Yes

ABCCC
Overall

DTN41

Yes

Rivet JOINT

C.CALL
DTN32

Yes

AWACS

Yes
Assume Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

C.CALL

Yes

JSTARS

Yes

Rivet JOINT

Yes

No

Yes

ABCCC
Overall

Assume Yes
Assume Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Table 5 – 2 Payload Design and Electromagnetic Compatibility of MMA Alternatives
5.3 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in Operational Scenarios
As a well-known and recently most used platform in operations, Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are remotely piloted or self-piloted aircrafts that can carry
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cameras, sensors, communications equipments or other required payloads for the mission.
They have been used in operational environments for reconnaissance and intelligence
gathering role since 1950s. Besides its incredible value in operation theaters, it has a
disadvantage of having high cost and technology requirements. Since 1964 11 different
UAVs have been developed by the Defense Department, but only 3 of them have entered
production because of acquisition and development problems. Presently a number of
UAVs are used both domestically and internationally. Their payload weight carrying
capability and their accommodations (volume, environment), their mission profile
(altitude, range, duration) and their command, control and data acquisition capabilities
vary significantly.
At the beginning of the last twenty years, the Department of Defense required
satisfaction of surveillance requirements in Close Range, Short Range or endurance
categories from UAVs. Close range and Short Range were defined to be within 50 km,
and 200 km respectively. The endurance was defined as anything beyond these ranges.
Then the Close and Short ranges are combined together and now the categories are
defined as Tactical UAV and the Endurance category. The titles of UAVs’ and their
capabilities are shown in Table 5-3.
5.3.1 Tactical UAV
The Tactical UAV is designed to support tactical commanders with nearreal-time imagery intelligence at ranges up to 200 km. The material solution for TUAV
requirements is being pursued through a completive acquisition process.
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5.3.2 Joint Tactical UAV (Hunter)
The Joint Tactical UAV is developed to provide ground and maritime
forces with near-real-time imagery intelligence at ranges up to 200 km; extensible to
300+ km by using another Hunter UAV as an airborne relay.
5.3.3 Medium Altitude Endurance UAV (Predator)
The Medium Altitude Endurance UAV provides imagery intelligence to
satisfy Joint Task Force and Theater Commanders at ranges out to 500 nautical miles. It
is transferred from US Army inventory to US Air Force in 1996.
5.3.4 High Altitude Endurance UAV (Global Hawk)
The High Altitude Endurance UAV is intended for missions requiring lonrange deployment and wide-area surveillance (EO/and SAR) or long sensor dwell over
the target area. It is directly deployable from Continental United States (CONUS) to the
theater of operations. The US Air Force manages the Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (ACTD).
5.3.5 Tactical Control Station (TCS)
The Tactical Control Station is the software and communications links
required to control the TUAV, MAE-UAV, and other tactical UAVs. The other C4I
systems are also provided.
5.3.6 Micro Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (MAVs)
This is a very small aircrafts which is less than 15 cm/6 inch in any
dimensions. This is still in development for future military operations. The development
and flight enabling studies continue.
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Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Name

Endurance Payload Weight Altitude Capability
(Hours)

(Pounds)

(Feet)

AQM-34N Firebee

Classified.

Classified

Classified.

Aquila

Classified.

Classified.

Classified.

COMPASS ARROW

Classified.

Classified.

Classified.

COMPASS BIN

Classified.

Classified.

Classified.

COMPASS COPE

Classified.

Classified.

Classified.

COMPASS DAWN

Classified.

Classified.

Classified.

Condor

Classified.

Classified.

Classified.

CR-TUAV

Classified.

Classified.

Classified.

CR-UAV

Classified.

Classified.

Classified.

Darkstar

8 hrs.

1,000 lbs.

45,000 ft.

Classified.

Classified.

Classified.

Eagle Eye

8 hrs.

300 lbs.

20,000 ft.

Exdrone

2.5 hr.

25 lbs

10,000 ft.

1.25 hrs.

470 lbs.

60,000 ft.

Global Hawk

42 hrs.

1,960 lbs.

65,000 ft.

Gnat 750

48 hrs.

140 lbs.

25,000 ft.

Hunter

12 hrs.

200 lbs.

15,000 ft.

Model 324

2.5 hrs.

200 lbs.

43,000 ft.

Model 410

12 hrs.

300 lbs.

30,000 ft.

MR-UAV

Classified.

Classified.

Classified.

MRE

Classified.

Classified.

Classified.

4 hrs.

160 lbs.

15,000 ft.

Dragon

Firebee

Outrider
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Pioneer

5.5 hrs.

75 lbs.

12,000 ft.

Pointer

1 hr.

2 lbs.

3,000 ft.

29 hrs.

700 lbs.

+40,000 ft.

SEA FERRET

Classified.

Classified.

Classified.

SENIOR BOWL [D-21]

Classified.

Classified.

Classified.

VT-UAV

Classified.

Classified.

Classified.

VT-UAV Dragonfly

Classified.

Classified.

Classified.

VT-UAV Vigilante

Classified.

Classified.

Classified.

VT-UAV Guardian

Classified.

Classified.

Classified.

Predator

Table 5 – 3 Titles and Capabilities of UAVs (41) (42)
5.4 Conclusion
As a whole study, multimission aircraft design study-operational scenarios,
presents some very high level results based on assumed and notional operational data. In
order to reach exact results and conclusions for this MMA feasibility study, the person
who is studying the subject must be an expert in this field and also this person has to be
able to access to all kind of classified data.
This study is also based on few alternative MMA architectures. By studying the
other alternative MMA architecture options, more realistic results can be evaluated. This
would require a lot of time and investigations. Besides the future technology
developments should be evaluated and presented within the study.
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A-1

A-2

The sensor on board of individual AWACS, JSTARS, RIVET JOINT, ABCCC AND
COMPASS CALL aircrafts doesn’t interfere with each other. So the radar range of each
Aircraft doesn’t have any distance limitation when aircrafts are planned in an
operational scenario.
In an operational scenario, each C3CMISR can be able to track more than one fixed and
moving target.
The orbit diameter of each C3CMISR and Tanker aircraft is 40 miles.
The escort fighter aircrafts fly around the C3CMISR and Tanker aircrafts within a safe
orbit.
The airbases A1 and A2 have all the capabilities and facilities that required for all
C3CMISR, Tanker and fighter aircrafts. The maintenance of all aircrafts can be handled
without any problem.
The ratio of Pilot/Chair for an aircraft is within the requirements.
Tanker aircrafts cap over at least 100 miles out of the area of operation and forward line
of troops (FLOT).
The C3CMISR, Tanker and fighter aircrafts flies in an area which is cleared from
civilian airlines route.
The alternative MMA aircrafts’ crew numbers are notional.
The fighter and bomber aircrafts and escort aircrafts’ number are totally notional. They
cannot be specified, because they change through the mission type and requirements.
The maximum crew flight limitation is not exceeded in missions. When the time
exceeds, the crew is taken to rest room.

A-3

The radar ranges of COMPASS CALL and ABCCC are assumed not farther than
AWACS’ radar range which is 250 miles/355.5 km.
Because of the cruise speed difference, while the fighter and bomber aircrafts attack
package fly the C3CMISR architectures cannot proceed with the same speed with it. It
proceeds within the radar range of it and provide continuous coverage for the
operational units.
The sensors on board have on-off capabilities while performing the mission.

A-4

A-5

C/DFD – 1: CONTEXT DIAGRAM

A-6

C/DFD 0: PERFORM_C3CMISR_REQUIREMENTS

APPENDIX D

A-7

A-7

C/DFD 1: DEPLOY

A-8

C/DFD 2: OPERATE

A-9

C/DFD 3: EXPLOIT

Distance Calculations between Two Points
Because of the spherical shape of the Earth, calculating the exact distance
between two points requires the use of spherical geometry and trigonometric math
functions. However, the approximate distance can be calculated by using much simpler
math functions. For many applications the approximate distance calculation provides
sufficient accuracy with much less complexity. The following approximate distance
calculations are relatively simple, but can produce distance errors of 10 percent of more.
These approximate calculations are performed using latitude and longitude values in
degrees. The first approximation requires only simple math functions:
approximate distance in miles = sqrt(x * x + y * y) (1)
where x = 69.1 * (lat2 - lat1)
and y = 53 * (lon2 - lon1)
The accuracy of this approximate distance calculation can be improved by adding
the cosine math function:
Approximate distance
where
and

y

in

x

=

=

69.1

miles

= sqrt(x * x +

69.1
*

(lon2

*
-

y *

(lat2
lon1)

y)
-

*

(2)
lat1)

cos(lat1/57.3)

If a greater accuracy is needed, the exact distance calculation must be used. The
exact distance calculation requires use of spherical geometry, since the Earth is a sphere.
The exact distance calculation also requires a high level of floating point mathematical
accuracy - about 15 digits of accuracy (sometimes called "double-precision"). Many
computer languages do not provide sufficient accuracy for this calculation. In addition,
the trigonometric math functions used in the exact calculation require conversion of the
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latitude and longitude values from degrees to radians. To convert latitude or longitude
from degrees to radians, the latitude and longitude values must be divided by 180/pi, or
57.2958. The radius of the Earth is assumed to be 6,378 kilometers, or 3,963 miles. If all
latitude and longitude values are converted to radians before the calculation, the
following equation is used;
Exact distance in miles = 3963 * arccos[ sin(lat1) * sin(lat2) + cos(lat1) *
cos(lat2) * cos(lon2 – lon1)]

(3)

If the latitude and longitude values aren’t converted to radians first, the degreesto-radians conversion must be included in the calculation. Substituting degrees for
radians, the calculation becomes:
Exact distance in miles = 3963 * arccos[sin(lat1/57.2958) * sin(lat2/57.2958) +
cos(lat1/57.2958) * cos(lat2/57.2958) *
cos(lon2/57.2958 – lon1/57.2958)]

(4)

or
Exact distance = arccos[ sin(lat1) * sin(lat2) + cos(lat1) *
cos(lat2) * cos(lon2 – lon1)] * r

(5)

where r is the radius of the earth in whatever units are desired, like;
r = 3437.74677

(statute miles)

r = 6378

(kilometers)

r = 3963

(normal miles)

All of the above formulas are giving the same answers in different units. As
known;
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1 degree = 0.01745329 radians
1 degree = 60 minutes = 3600 seconds
1 minute = 0.000291 radians
1 second = 0.000005 radians
1 mile

= 1.609344 kilometers
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POINT

LATITUTE
(degree)

LONGITUTE
(degree)

LATITUTE
(radian)

LONGITUTE
(radian)

A1

36 59 16 N

35 18 48 E

0.645481 N

0.616101 E

A2

28 56 05 N

47 47 31 E

0.505006 N

0.834127 E

T1

33 19 38 N

44 22 09 E

0.583328 N

0.774388 E

T2

36 18 23 N

43 08 38 E

0.633666 N

0.753003 E

T3

30 32 32 N

46 36 07 E

0.533062 N

0.813357 E

T4

30 25 18 N

47 38 32 E

0.530958 N

0.831514 E

T5

33 21 20 N

40 35 48 E

0.582164 N

0.708545 E

Exact Distance = arccos[sin(lat1)*sin(lat2) + cos(lat1)*cos(lat2)*cos(lon2-lon1)] * 3963

DISTANCE
BETWEEN

DISTANCE
(n.miles)

DISTANCE
(kms)

A1 - T1

580

950

A1 - T2

440

710

A1 - T3

790

1,280

A1 - T4

840

1,350

A1 - T5

390

630

A2 - T1

370

590

A2 - T2

580

935

A2 - T3

130

210

A2 - T4

105

170

A2 - T5

525

845

T1 - T2

212

400

T1 - T3

239

384

T1 - T4

283

455

T1 - T5

218

351

T2- T3

446

718

T2- T4

483

778

T2- T5

251

404

T3- T4

63

102

T3- T5

403

649

T4- T5

461

742

A-22

MISSILES

AIR-TO-GROUND

MISSILES

AIR-TO-AIR

Active Radar

AIM-120 AMRAAM

Strap down Inertial and Imaging

AIM-132 ASRAAM

RAINBOW

A-12

Subsonic

Fragmentation

40 lb Blast

Preprogrammed Anti-Radar Missile

265 lb gross, 11o lb HE,

AGM-136 TACIT

Mach 1.2

145 lb Fragmentation

Penetrating HE (488 lb)

145 lb Fragmentation

125 lb Shaped Charge

125 lb Shaped Charge

Semi-armor Piercing

Inertial and Infrared Terminal

AGM-119 PENGUIN

Classified

Subsonic

High

Classified

Mach 0.65

Mach 0.65

Fragmentation

22.05 lb (10kg) Blast

Fragmentation

500 m/s
Mach 3+

HE Blast

Fragmentation

12 kg HE Blast

Fragmentation

Annular Blast

40 lb High Explosive (HE)

22 lb blast fragmentation

22 lb blast fragmentation

WARHEAD

Mach 2.7/

Mach 4

Classified

Mach 4+

Mach 2+

Mach 2+

SPEED

ANTI-SHIP MISSILE

Passive Radar

Homing

Altimeter, Active Radar Terminal

AGM-88A HARM

AGM-84D HARPOON

Sea-skimming Cruise Using Radar

Passive Radar

Imaging Infrared

AGM-65D MAVERICK

AGM-45A SHRIKE

TV with Magnification

AGM-65B MAVERICK

Infrared

All-aspect Infrared

or Imaging IR

Command, Inertial and Active Radar

Radar Energy

Continuous Wave or Pulsed Doppler

MAGIC R.550

MICA

AIM-7 SPARROW

Rear-aspect Infrared

AIM-9P SIDEWINDER
Raytheon Semi-Active on Either

All-aspect Infrared

SEEKER

AIM-9M SIDEWINDER

MISSILE

50 miles +

35 km

25 nm/

30 miles

Horizon

Over the

12 miles

to 15 km)
0.6 to 14
miles
0.6 to 14
miles

8 nm (300 m

8 miles

28 miles

50 km/

Classified

25 miles

10 miles

10 miles

RANGE

MISSILES

AIR-TO-GROUND

AS-30L

A-22

Semi-Active Laser-Homing

System (INS)

SURFACE STANDOFF

MISSILE (JASSM)

GPS-Aided Inertial Navigation

Classified

INS With GPS Updates

SEEKER

AGM-158 JOINT AIR TO

(JSOW)

STAND OFF WEAPON

AGM-154A JOINT

MISSILE (TSSAM)

STAND OFF ATTACK

AGM-137 TRI-SERVICE

MISSILE

1700 km/h

Classified

Classified

Classified

SPEED

Armor Piercing 240 kg

Impact-Fused HE Semi-

Classified

Classified

1000 lb

WARHEAD

3 to 10 km

Classified

to 40 nm

From 15 nm

100 nm +

RANGE

*Battle Management
*Communications

up to the Stratosphere
*300,000 sq km

Radar System

Joint STARS

28 Operators

*4 Analysis Operators

*Jamming

and Control Center

*Communications

EC-130E

ABCCC

Classified

*High Band Operator

*Counter Measure

*Battlefield Command

*Acquisition Operator

*Communications

CALL

*Communications

*Intelligence

*Operations

*Command

12 Operators

*AMT

A-32

*Cryptologic Linguist

*Control

COMPASS

*EWO (MCC)

*Operate and Maintain

9 Operators

*Maintenance

*Communications

*Intelligence

*Weapons

*Surveillance

*Battle Management

*Tactical Command
Classified

(50,000 sq km)

*19,306 sq miles

view

*120 degree field of

(160 miles)

*more than 250 km

EC-130H

*ECM System

(Jam-Resistant)

Target Attack

E-8C

*Joint Surveillance

technicians

*4 in-flight/airborne
maintenance

on-scene)

Operators

*14 Intelligence

*IMINT

(155 miles)

(near real time

*ELINT

Up to 240 km

Collection

RIVET JOINT

*3 EW Officers

*Intelligence

RC-135 V/W

21-27 Operators

*Reconnaissance

field of view

*Weapon Control

the Earth Surface

*Identification

*Communications

*Surveillance

Surveillance from

*C2

*360 degree

13-19 Operators

CREW

*Surveillance

(375.5 km)

More than 250 miles

RADAR RANGE

AWACS

MISSION

E-3 Sentry

AIRCRAFT

Classified

(w/o air refueling)

* 10 hrs

(w/ air refueling)

* 20 hrs

(w/o air refueling)

* 11 hrs

(w/ air refueling)

* 20 hrs

(w/o air refueling)

* 11 hrs

(w/o air refueling)

mission profile

More than 8 hrs

MAX FLIGHT HR

Classified

*Jamming

*Ground Surveillance

*Reconnaissance

Collection

*Signals Intelligence

and Communications

*Command, Control

*Airborne Surveillance

PRIMARY FUNCTION

Classified

Classified

2,800 miles +

refueling)

(unlimited w/ air

(6,500 kms)

3,900 miles

Classified

UNREFUELED
RANGE

Classified

Classified

(Mach 0.84)

(Mach 0.66)

500+ mph

(Mach 0.48)

360 mph

Optimum cruise

SPEED

COMPASS CALL

ABCCC

RIVET JOINT

JSTARS

AWACS

A/C NAME

DIFFERENT TAIL
NUMBERS

DTN1

DTN12

RIVET JOINT

*3 Operations

*1 Cryptologic

*4 Analysis Operators

*1 Acquisition Operator

*1 Cryptologic Linguist

*4 in-flight/airborne maintenance

*3 Command

*14 Intelligence

*3 EW Officers

*1 AMT

A-42

ABCCC
COMPASS CALL

*3 Communications

*1 EWO (MCC)

9 Operators
*1 Operate and
Maintain

*3 Communications

*3 Intelligence

*3 Operations

*3 Command

12 Operators

*5 Intelligence
*3 in-flight/airborne maintenance

technicians

*5 Communications

*5 Battle Management

*5 Weapon Control

*4 Identification

maintenance

*4 in-flight/airborne

Operators

*14 Intelligence

*3 EW Officers
JSTARS

*3 Maintenance

*5 Surveillance

*3 Command
*4 in-flight/airborne maintenance

*5 Communications

AWACS

*3 Operations

*5 Intelligence

21 Operators

*4 Analysis Operators

*1 Acquisition Operator

*1 Cryptologic Linguist

*14 Intelligence Operators

*3 EW Officers

*5 Weapons

DTN11

COMPASS CALL

*5 Battle Management

*5 Surveillance

ABCCC

28 Operators

RIVET JOINT

*4 Communications

*5 Communications

*5 Battle Management

AWACS
JSTARS

*4 Battle Management

*5 Surveillance

CREW NEEDED

*5 Weapon Control

CONFIGURATON

*4 Identification

OTN

TITLE

*3 Weapon Control

ONE TAIL NUMBER

ALTERNATIVE MMA

*4 Identification

*4 Surveillance

19 Operators

CREW NEEDED

Operators

37

Operators

32

Operators

57

TOTAL

COMPASS CALL

*1 AMT

*4 Analysis
Operators

*1 Acquisition
Operator

Linguist

DIFFERENT TAIL
NUMBERS

A-52

DTN3

DTN2

DTN31

DTN22

DTN21

RIVET JOINT

AWACS

COMPASS CALL

RIVET JOINT

JSTARS

*4 Communications

ABCCC

*14 Intelligence

*4 in-flight/airborne maintenance

*3 EW Officers

*4 Communications

*4 Battle Management

*3 Weapon Control

*4 Identification

*4 Surveillance

*1 AMT

*4 Analysis Operators

*1 Acquisition Operator

*1 Cryptologic Linguist

*4 in-flight/airborne maintenance

*3 EW Officers

*5 Communications

*14 Intelligence

*5 Weapons

*5 Surveillance

*5 Battle Management

*3 Operations

*3 Command

*3 Intelligence

*4 Battle Management

AWACS

*3 Weapon Control

*4 Identification

*4 Surveillance

28

Operators

40

Operators

48

Operators

DIFFERENT TAIL
NUMBERS

A-62

DTN4

DTN42

DTN41

DTN32

ABCCC

RIVET JOINT

JSTARS

COMPASS CALL

AWACS

*3 Command

ABCCC

*14 Intelligence

*3 EW Officers

*5 Communications

*5 Intelligence

*5 Weapons

*5 Surveillance

*5 Battle Management

*1 AMT

*4 Analysis Operators

*1 Acquisition Operator

*1 Cryptologic Linguist

*1 in-flight/airborne maintenance

*1 EW Officers

*4 Communications

*4 Battle Management

*3 Weapon Control

*4 Identification

*4 Surveillance

*1 AMT

*4 Analysis Operators

*1 Acquisition Operator

*1 Cryptologic Linguist

*3 in-flight/airborne maintenance

*3 Operations

*1 EW Officers

*5 Communications

*5 Intelligence
COMPASS CALL

JSTARS

*5 Weapons

*5 Surveillance

*5 Battle Management

42

Operators

52

Operators

28

Operators

A-72

*4 in-flight/airborne maintenance

*3 Operations

*3 Command

OTN

One Tail
Number

Different Tail
Numbers

ALTERNATIVE

TYPE

DTN4

DTN3

DTN2

DTN1

ARCHITECTURE

ARCHITECTURE

DTN42

DTN41

DTN32

DTN31

DTN22

DTN21

DTN12

DTN11

OTN

TITLE

ALTERNATIVE

ABCCC

Rivet JOINT

A-82

240 km

155 miles

355.5 km

JSTARS

250 miles

C.CALL

250 km

AWACS

ABCCC

C.CALL

160 miles

240 km

JSTARS

155 miles

Rivet JOINT

240 km

AWACS

C.CALL

Rivet JOINT

155 miles

355.5 km

JSTARS

250 miles

ABCCC

240 km

AWACS

ABCCC

C.CALL

155 miles

250 km

Rivet JOINT

160 miles

AWACS

240 km

155 miles

RANGE

RADAR

JSTARS

ABCCC

C.CALL

Rivet JOINT

JSTARS

AWACS

ON BOARD

A/C

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

850 km/hr

SPEED

CRUISE

56

32

46

44

52

32

41

36

61

NUMBER

CREW

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Defined

Cannot

WEIGHT

MAXIMUM

50k ft

50k ft

50k ft

50k ft

50k ft

50k ft

50k ft

50k ft

5Ok ft

CEILING

MAXIMUM

36k ft

36k ft

36k ft

36k ft

36k ft

36k ft

36k ft

36k ft

36k ft

ALTITUDE

CRUISE

Cannot

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Defined

WEIGHT

POSSIBILITY

CREW #

POSSIBILITY

REFUELS

2

1

2

2

2

1

2

1

2

REQUIRED

SENSOR

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

NO

COMPATIBILITY

POWER

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

A-92

POSSIBILITY

9.26
12.09294118
11.80941176
12.52823529
11.54823529
11.91764706
11.22117647
12.41882353
11.65647059

OTN

DTN11

DTN12

DTN21

DTN22

DTN31

DTN32

DTN41

DTN42
2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

TAKE OFF FROM SEA LEVEL

A-102

OTN HAS TO BE REFUELED JUST 0.5447 HOUR AFTER THE TAKEOFF FROM 8000 FEET LONG AT 6000FT ALTITUDE

2

2

3

2

3

2

2

2

3

TAKE OFF FROM 8000FEET

REFUELS REQUIRED

OTN CAN NOT TAKE OFF FROM AN 8000 FEET LONG RUNWAY AT 8000 FEET ALTITUDE

ENDURANCE(hr)

8000FT

RUNWAY LENGTH
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